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Yes and no. It is a difficult problem, but it has been done before (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine%E2%80%93American_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Yes and no. It is a difficult problem, but it has been done before (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine%E2%80%93American_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine%E2%80%93American_Wa..., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malayan_Emergency, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_Wars https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_Wars). There is a rough roadmap about how to go about it, something along the lines of suppressing the rebels and providing security for the majority of the populace while you reform the government and establish its credibility. In Vietnam, this was made more difficult by the international situation and by the ease of outsiders intervening to support the Viet Cong (such as the NVA). Similarly in Afghanistan, with the additional problem that the US never realized that Afghan nationalism isn't a thing. (My interpretation; the US Army has a big, long analysis of what it thinks went wrong that I haven't read.) The problem is that quantitative metrics hide the difficulties and provide a false sense that the situation can be resolved easily and cheaply. McNamara's body count idea makes a certain amount of sense, given that the strategy there was to cost the NVA so much that they could not continue to push troops into South Vietnam, which might have worked if that was the only major problem.

rossdavidh 5y ago
While I grant you the Phillipines was somewhat of a success, I don't think either the Malay example (where the same combat flared up again within a few years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%931989) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malays...) or the Yugoslav wars (where it was a war between ethnicities, and it most decidedly did not result in Yugoslavia being put back together) would count as successes. But, the Phillipines example does seem like a plausible example. Even then, it essentially ended because the US decided to let the Phillipines elect their own assembly, clearly setting them on the path towards independence. Maybe the lesson is that if your military is involved in trying to suppress the rebels, declare victory and leave, without making too many demands of what kind of government is there once you are gone.
- mcguire 5y ago
  The Malaysian Emergency (1948-1960) is pretty widely regarded as the successful counterinsurgency program. (It also featured little to no external support to the insurgents, who were massively outnumbered by the British. Did I mention that this wasn't an easy problem?) The second insurgency (1968-1989-ish) was largely handled by Malaysia itself, as I understand it, without outside forces. I was debating the former Yugoslavia, but no one was really interested in rebuilding Yugoslavia; they wanted the region to be quiet and relatively stable. Which it seems to be today and wasn't without the continuing threat of military force from sometime during the Austro-Hungarian empire. Before you draw lessons from the Philippine-American War, look at the timeline: it officially started when the US took over the management from Spain in ~1899 and ended in like 1913. The (new) Philippine government was created in 1902 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Organic_Act_(1902) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Organic_Act_(1902)) with the cessation of the official war. The US kept a military presence as well as official control until WWII, with apparently a good bit of support from the Filipinos. The US was very specific about the kind of government it set up in the Philippines and not only didn't leave but stayed and supported the government against the remnants of the insurgency. If you're interested, I strongly recommend 21st Century Ellis, a (small) collection of articles by Pete Ellis, a Marine officer in the Philippines who went on to be part of WWI and to write the basis of the US Marines' part of the pre-WWII plans against the Japanese Empire. (He drank himself to death while spying on the Japanese and the guy sent to recover his ashes was himself killed in the Kyoto earthquake. It's all very Lovecraftian.) His "Bush Wars" (?) is roughly the basis of US counter insurgency strategy that the US couldn't bother to follow in Afghanistan.
lstodd 5y ago
In Vietnam the problem was the 15ish year long civil war predating all the things. In Afganistan, the same thing, only longer. This stuff can't be fixed by landing some marines, it only turns it into a shit-throwing match about who has better SAMs and logistics. Which is a definition of a proxy war.
deleted 5y ago
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rossdavidh 5y ago

While I grant you the Phillipines was somewhat of a success, I don't think either the Malay example (where the same combat flared up again within a few years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malaysia_(1968%E2%80%931989) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_insurgency_in_Malays...) or the Yugoslav wars (where it was a war between ethnicities, and it most decidedly did not result in Yugoslavia being put back together) would count as successes. But, the Phillipines example does seem like a plausible example. Even then, it essentially ended because the US decided to let the Phillipines elect their own assembly, clearly setting them on the path towards independence. Maybe the lesson is that if your military is involved in trying to suppress the rebels, declare victory and leave, without making too many demands of what kind of government is there once you are gone.

mcguire 5y ago
The Malaysian Emergency (1948-1960) is pretty widely regarded as the successful counterinsurgency program. (It also featured little to no external support to the insurgents, who were massively outnumbered by the British. Did I mention that this wasn't an easy problem?) The second insurgency (1968-1989-ish) was largely handled by Malaysia itself, as I understand it, without outside forces. I was debating the former Yugoslavia, but no one was really interested in rebuilding Yugoslavia; they wanted the region to be quiet and relatively stable. Which it seems to be today and wasn't without the continuing threat of military force from sometime during the Austro-Hungarian empire. Before you draw lessons from the Philippine-American War, look at the timeline: it officially started when the US took over the management from Spain in ~1899 and ended in like 1913. The (new) Philippine government was created in 1902 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Organic_Act_(1902) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_Organic_Act_(1902)) with the cessation of the official war. The US kept a military presence as well as official control until WWII, with apparently a good bit of support from the Filipinos. The US was very specific about the kind of government it set up in the Philippines and not only didn't leave but stayed and supported the government against the remnants of the insurgency. If you're interested, I strongly recommend 21st Century Ellis, a (small) collection of articles by Pete Ellis, a Marine officer in the Philippines who went on to be part of WWI and to write the basis of the US Marines' part of the pre-WWII plans against the Japanese Empire. (He drank himself to death while spying on the Japanese and the guy sent to recover his ashes was himself killed in the Kyoto earthquake. It's all very Lovecraftian.) His "Bush Wars" (?) is roughly the basis of US counter insurgency strategy that the US couldn't bother to follow in Afghanistan.

lstodd 5y ago

In Vietnam the problem was the 15ish year long civil war predating all the things. In Afganistan, the same thing, only longer. This stuff can't be fixed by landing some marines, it only turns it into a shit-throwing match about who has better SAMs and logistics. Which is a definition of a proxy war.

deleted 5y ago

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