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> Consider, for instance, if there are two countries (A and B) looking at conflict with perfect information. Given their relative strengths, the war will cost b
by thaumasiotes 5y ago
> Consider, for instance, if there are two countries (A and B) looking at conflict with perfect information. Given their relative strengths, the war will cost both $1 billion, but A will win and reap $1 billion + $1 in plunder. In your model, B will always surrender and give A $1
In the perfect information scenario, B will surrender more than $1. B is better off at any tribute level up to $1,000,000,000.
- aeturnum 5y agoSure, I didn't go far into detail, but it's actually worse than either of us has said because once B surrenders anything ($1 or $1,000,000,000), they are at even greater disadvantage and "logically" should surrender more money. In fact, they should surrender the entire country, as once they are at a disadvantage A can keep coming back forever. Effectively, the idea that war would not happen with perfect information suggests that the logical thing to do is for all countries to surrender control to the strongest country immediately.
- thaumasiotes 5y agoThe norm is that you pay regularly occurring tribute until such time as you feel you probably don't have to anymore. But there's no norm of surrendering control; that's a conquest, not a tribute.