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This seems untrue. There are also genuine uncertainties about the future: things that neither side knows but will impact the outcome. Because of that, there is

This seems untrue. There are also genuine uncertainties about the future: things that neither side knows but will impact the outcome. Because of that, there is always a range of outcomes for a conflict, and so both sides would still have an incentive to carry out the war. Consider, for instance, if there are two countries (A and B) looking at conflict with perfect information. Given their relative strengths, the war will cost both $1 billion, but A will win and reap $1 billion + $1 in plunder. In your model, B will always surrender and give A $1, but the reality is there is a big spread about both the costs and the gains. Lots depends on how well each side fights and responds, even with perfect knowledge of the other. So...you know, if it's the US versus...the Philippines[1], then sure, the uncertain range of outcomes is small enough that rational thing for the Philippines to do is surrender. But for countries that are even reasonably well-matched, they would want to fight with the goal of making the conflict unattractive for the other side. Probably the best historical example of this is the USSR in Afghanistan. [1] I am sure the US would never invade and occupy them just because the US found it convenient ;)

thaumasiotes 5y ago
> Consider, for instance, if there are two countries (A and B) looking at conflict with perfect information. Given their relative strengths, the war will cost both $1 billion, but A will win and reap $1 billion + $1 in plunder. In your model, B will always surrender and give A $1 In the perfect information scenario, B will surrender more than $1. B is better off at any tribute level up to $1,000,000,000.
- aeturnum 5y ago
  Sure, I didn't go far into detail, but it's actually worse than either of us has said because once B surrenders anything ($1 or $1,000,000,000), they are at even greater disadvantage and "logically" should surrender more money. In fact, they should surrender the entire country, as once they are at a disadvantage A can keep coming back forever. Effectively, the idea that war would not happen with perfect information suggests that the logical thing to do is for all countries to surrender control to the strongest country immediately.
  - thaumasiotes 5y ago
    The norm is that you pay regularly occurring tribute until such time as you feel you probably don't have to anymore. But there's no norm of surrendering control; that's a conquest, not a tribute.

thaumasiotes 5y ago

> Consider, for instance, if there are two countries (A and B) looking at conflict with perfect information. Given their relative strengths, the war will cost both $1 billion, but A will win and reap $1 billion + $1 in plunder. In your model, B will always surrender and give A $1 In the perfect information scenario, B will surrender more than $1. B is better off at any tribute level up to $1,000,000,000.

aeturnum 5y ago
Sure, I didn't go far into detail, but it's actually worse than either of us has said because once B surrenders anything ($1 or $1,000,000,000), they are at even greater disadvantage and "logically" should surrender more money. In fact, they should surrender the entire country, as once they are at a disadvantage A can keep coming back forever. Effectively, the idea that war would not happen with perfect information suggests that the logical thing to do is for all countries to surrender control to the strongest country immediately.
- thaumasiotes 5y ago
  The norm is that you pay regularly occurring tribute until such time as you feel you probably don't have to anymore. But there's no norm of surrendering control; that's a conquest, not a tribute.