4 ms·
That's a fallacious line of reasoning on several fronts. A) The beneficiaries of a war need not be the ones who pay the cost. If you personally stand to benefi
by vlovich123 5y ago
That's a fallacious line of reasoning on several fronts.
A) The beneficiaries of a war need not be the ones who pay the cost. If you personally stand to benefit from the war itself, regardless of win or lose, you want the war.
B) It's applying a rational economics approach when it's pretty clear that humans aren't rational. Japan kept fighting even when it was clear they would lose. Pride, image, your future after the war. All things that impact the decision that gets made.
C) War isn't typically total like it was in WWII. Most wars are just skirmishes or prolonged skirmishes that don't meaningfully change borders. In such a scenario, a single "war" loss may still be an important fight to have in the middle of the overall conflict (i.e. to signal to your opponent that you're not a pushover and that continuing on their current path has consequences).
D) Win/lose isn't the only outcome of war. Lose/lose is also another scenario. Additionally, you might lose the war but winning may not be the goal. For example, maybe it only takes me 1/10th the resources for me to wage the war that it takes for you to win. A single war might cost me 100 units, but it's important for me to be able to cause you to spend 1000 units because then I have a 900 unit advantage in some other area.
There's many more, but I don't think imperfect information is the only reason war exists.
- tomrod 5y ago(1) Externalities are handled in the game theory literature (2) Preference definitions are not in scope for most game theory lit; what you're describing are preferences and expected utility, which ARE in the literature and metamodel (3) This is not really true. It depends on how big you are and how big your coalition is. Consider that Saddam Hussain is no longer in charge of Iraq. (4) Yes, potential outcomes are considered under game theory. I get your point that OP's statement feels reductionist, but I wanted to explain that the OP is actually correct.
- mcguire 5y agoYou didn't work at Rand in the 1960s, did you? :-) Anyway, the OP may be correct, but is also completely useless since it is impossible to know your own true strength, much less that of the other side.
- tomrod 5y agoLOL, no, but, reading the research of that period, it would have been fun! Bell labs in the 1970s and 1980s as well. It's not totally useless; the game theory framework is still helpful if you define your expected ROI (and your competitors). It is decision and strategy under uncertainty, of course, but its still a useful decision approach.
- vlovich123 5y agoI took OPs statement at face value: > If each side really knew the true strength of the other side, it would be clear which would win and therefore actual war is illogical and unnecessary. No, knowing the true strength is insufficient. I laid out other kinds of pieces of information that also influence the war being logical and necessary as well as the war being illogical and unnecessary and still happening. Now, you could strengthen the argument and say "what OP meant was that if we had all the information needed to build a model to accurately predict the exact outcome to a high degree of confidence". To me that's the same as the "god of the gaps" argument though because at the most reduced state you end up with the classical position of "well, if I had the state of every particle in the universe I could predict what would happen". The simulation aspect is physically impossible as far as we know according to [1] because the amount of compute needed would be the universe itself. So now you have to start building a model that trades off error and complexity so that you could actually make a decision before the heat death of the universe. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03880 https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03880
- asdff 5y agoI really don't think the GP is wrong here. Yes there are ideologues, but there were plenty in the Japanese high command who understood logistics and understood that war with the U.S. would end the Japanese empire. It was the same way with Germany. The people who understood logistics knew it would be absolutely impossible to win a two front war and nearly impossible to win a one front war with the U.S. having a thumb on the scales just with lend lease alone. Germany sent their best generals to the east and they knew they had no hope but to delay the inevitable, and no alternative but to listen to Hitler. They continued to fight because to deny Hitler's madness often meant less than favorable outcomes for these commanders than making peace with Allies in 1945. The war in Japan ended when it became impossible for the emperor to continue with the cognitive dissonance and ignore the fact that the fight had ended years before it even began. Logistics have won every war there ever was.
- the_af 5y ago> Germany sent their best generals to the east and they knew they had no hope but to delay the inevitable, and no alternative but to listen to Hitler. They continued to fight because to deny Hitler's madness often meant less than favorable outcomes for these commanders That's not entirely true, though. Modern WW2 historiography acknowledges that this vision of WW2, that "Hitler was mad and his generals were afraid to contradict him", is mostly the version the surviving German generals gave in their self-serving memories, as a way to save face and paint themselves as more useful to the West during the Cold War. More recent assessments contradict this version and show many German generals were enthusiastic about war with the Soviet Union, they fully expected to win, and in many cases goaded Hitler into making fatal mistakes he himself wasn't as sure about (an example: Operation Citadel, the battle of Kursk). The ones who knew the enterprise was doomed? The logistics guys, who did the calculations and predicted when the Wehrmacht would overextend itself and run out of supplies -- not the generals! Professor Jonathan House, an American military historian specializing on WW2's Eastern Front, has a whole lecture about this, available on YouTube.