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This is a failure of the security model underlying the operating system design. Operating Systems exist to securely multiplex the resources of a system and mak
by mikewarot 5y ago
This is a failure of the security model underlying the operating system design.
Operating Systems exist to securely multiplex the resources of a system and make them fairly and reliably available to the user of that system. In order to do so, the first order of business is that the system should observe the principle of least privilege. That is, it should grant no privileges by default, and only grant access to the resources required for a task to complete.
iOS, Android, Linux, Unix, Windows, pretty much any modern operating system makes zero provisions for enforcing the principle of least privilege.
Analogy: You owe someone $5 for an ice cream cone. Do you hand over your wallet and all of your 2fa credentials to that person, and hope they only take $5? No, you reach into your wallet, and extract a $5 bill. That is a capability that gives the holder $5 of spending power.
If you don't have a $5, you could give them $20, but your maximum loss would be that token. You don't have to worry about losing your title to your car during the transaction.
There is no equivalent mechanism for the average user to securely tell the OS to run this program with these resources, and trust that nothing else will happen, nor hidden surprises persist.
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Note that the crude "grant access to X" flags present in some phone OSs are NOT capabilities, though them might have that same overloaded name.
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Note that wallets aren't seen to be impractical, and people have been using them for a very long time. If you're tempted to say that an OS can't reflect that simplicity and ease of use, you just need to give people a few iterations to get it right.
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We need capability based security. We'll keep having these stories until we get it deployed widely.
- simonh 5y ago> Analogy: You owe someone $5 for an ice cream cone. Do you hand over your wallet and all of your 2fa credentials to that person, and hope they only take $5? We do this all the time with online transactions. Just because the website says $5, in principle when they charge your bank they could ask for as much as they like.
- mikewarot 5y agoWhich points to a design problem with credit card transactions. They should be able to generate a one time use number for giving X money in a single transaction. I've heard of some experiments in that direction, which is hopeful.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- watermelon0 5y agoIn many cases (I guess it depends on the payment gateway) I get a push notifications which opens a confirmation dialog in my bank's mobile app, where I see the merchant and the amount, and have to confirm it. I think this is most common with European payment gateways.
- simonh 5y agoSure, nowadays there are alerts that will help you spot any discrepancy more quickly, but it doesn’t stop the discrepancy occurring and we’ve been running blind on this for a very long time.
- saagarjha 5y ago> There is no equivalent mechanism for the average user to securely tell the OS to run this program with these resources, and trust that nothing else will happen, nor hidden surprises persist. You’re just not familiar with them. iOS has pervasive sandboxing allowing for fine-grained access control to system resources. Most sandbox profiles start by denying everything by default and adding in things deemed necessary for the program. The issue is that 1. sometimes the things added in are too broad or 2. the sandboxing mechanism itself is broken via an exploit.
- wolverine876 5y agoDo you know where that is documented?
- saagarjha 5y agoMost of it isn’t, at least officially. Sandboxing was never really exposed as a public API for third parties to use, so Apple doesn’t really discuss it in much detail.
- moonchild 5y agoAttempting to run untrusted code on trusted hardware is a fool's errand. Sandboxes do not work. Hardware privilege separation does not work. It is a lost cause. We need to start separating devices, and stop normalizing js.