4 ms·
This was always accounted for in Tor's threat model. That's why you take many different circuits depending on what location you're trying to reach. That's also
by southerntofu 5y ago
This was always accounted for in Tor's threat model. That's why you take many different circuits depending on what location you're trying to reach.
That's also why for the highest security needs VPN+Tor is a recommendation. Although to be fair i personally believe if an actor is powerful enough to perform traffic analysis across the Tor network, they're probably powerful enough to correlate your computer activity with the VPN<->tor link.
Networks that resist metadata analysis are called mixnets and there's some interesting research about them. The downsides are you add latency (because each hop needs to randomize sleep) so bidirectional sessions like TCP is unthinkable. So nothing as usable as Tor Browser for checking your webmail or reading a blog.
- summm 5y agoOr, instead of TCP, content-based storage as in Freenet.
- southerntofu 5y agoYes P2P CAS (torrent/freenet/ipfs) sounds very interesting over mixnets. Do you have links to specific implementations?
- summm 5y agoFreenet manages to implement some kind of anonymity without mixnets, relying on inserting/retrieving storage blocks sacrificing latency. In my opinion that's the better approach, because if you separate storage and communication, like ipfs-over-tor, you'll never get anything with proper anonymity and decent performance. Beyond that, I've heard of xolotl related to gnunet, but I am not sure to what extent it is actually implemented and/or working, as usual with gnunet.
- southerntofu 5y agoAre you aware of modern Freenet reimplementations, by any chance?
- goodpoint 5y agocontent-based storage is not "instead" of TCP. It's a different solution for a different requirement.
- southerntofu 5y agocorrect, content-addressed storage is often implemented on top of TCP. I wrongly used TCP to generically mean "location-addressed".