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How is it that we can't have an OS that stops such things? I'm of the opinion that the NSA must have a long running covert program to discourage the adoption o
by mikewarot 5y ago
How is it that we can't have an OS that stops such things?
I'm of the opinion that the NSA must have a long running covert program to discourage the adoption of secure operating systems.
Multilevel Secure Operating Systems have existed since the 1980s, yet most people haven't even heard of them.
- hypertele-Xii 5y agoFor the same reason we can't have pick-proof locks. Total security is physically impossible. You have to defend every access surface with equal flawlessness. Attackers can all coordinate on a single point of failure. By nature of this equation, any time you make a part more secure, attackers will simply focus their efforts on the next weakest link and go at it again. Immunity can't prevent disease from entering your body either; They can only make it harder and actively respond to intrusion.
- Scaevolus 5y agoThere's insufficient motivation for OS creators. It's possible to compile C code with various hardening options and pay a few percent overhead for it, but it remains almost entirely in the realm of academia... Except for the Xbox. Someone hacking an Xbox would lose _Microsoft_ money through piracy, which hurts their bottom line! As a result, the Xbox runs a type 1 hypervisor with various compiler hardening options like Control Flow Integrity enabled, and are generally some of the most locked down consumer devices sold today. What's Apple's motivation beyond bad press? iMessage was parsing media sent to it with a pdf parser. Sure, some activists in repressive regimes will get spied on and executed, but it's just so much effort to invest dev effort on rewrites for security when you could find new ways to send cute animated gifs to each other.
- mkj 5y agoWhich hardening options are Apple ignoring? I would have thought the standard types of ones (debian's default) would also be set on macos/ios, eg https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/devf87a2ac8f https://help.apple.com/xcode/mac/current/#/devf87a2ac8f From what I can tell all NSO's rigmarole of making a virtual machine in the PDF parser is to work around the existing mitigations. I guess they could also turn on asan etc in production but that's more than a few percent slowdown.
- WanderPanda 5y agoI don‘t know anything about the benefits of these options but if the tradeoff is only a slowdown of the device this should be an option given to the user. Maybe even payed for („hardened version“ at buy time) or through a subscription.
- jmnicolas 5y agoJust an anecdote but I use GrapheneOS on my phone. It's a security focused OS based on Android AOSP with in particular a secure memory allocation function. The whole OS feels much slower than regular Google Android, Osmand (map app) is barely usable (on a Pixel 4XL which isn't a low end phone by any means). So I don't think we can discount how much slower a device will be with a more secure OS. It might be invisible on desktops, but certainly not on mobile.
- jonway 5y agoIf the secure OS had the same development velocity as the OEM profit OS, the secure OS would be much better optimized than it currently is and likely much much more secure, too. Android and iOS are optimized in general and for example Google or Samsung also optimize and distribute it for specific hardware. GrapheneOS is not well funded and has little influence in hardware development. The development of Graphene from AOSP is pretty much guaranteed to de-optimize it in the short term. While there is little about mobile that would cause a secure OS to be noticably slower, much less mature software with many fewer deployments is expectedly less optimized.
- saagarjha 5y agoAddress Sanitizer is not meant to be used as security hardening.
- trulyme 5y agoMaybe we should use Xbox instead of phones for secure communication?
- Veserv 5y agoIt is the official policy of the US government that a Common Criteria EAL2 certification (i.e. "demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential" [1]) is adequate for government systems. This would likely correspond to a Class D, the lowest class, under the old Orange Book standard. In contrast, the only protection profile under Common Criteria designed to evaluate a MLS system, SKPP (Separation Kernel Protection Profile) [2], corresponds to a standard beyond EAL6 [3] (i.e. "demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a high attack potential"[4]), MLS systems evaluated under the old Orange Book standard correspond to Class B3 or A1. In contrast, until a few years ago, it was official government policy that EAL4 certification (i.e. "demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with an Enhanced-Basic attack potential"[5]) was adequate for government systems. This likely corresponds to Class C2 under the old Orange Book standard. This standard was chosen in the interest of allowing standard IT commercial vendors, such as Microsoft and Unix vendors, to submit competitive bids because it was deemed economically and technically infeasible for those systems to be retrofitted with adequate security to achieve a higher standard[6]. So, they instead set the standard to a level achievable by standard commercial IT vendors. They have since reduced it to EAL2 because they determined that requiring a EAL4 certification was too onerous, disqualified large vendors such as FireEye, and was unnecessary as the layering of enough EAL2 systems, each like a piece of swiss cheese, would result in systems comparable to EAL4 systems. [1] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R4.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3... Page 34 [2] https://www.niap-ccevs.org/profile/Info.cfm?PPID=65&id=65 https://www.niap-ccevs.org/profile/Info.cfm?PPID=65&id=65 [3] https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/pp_skpp_hr_v1.03.pdf https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/pp_skpp_hr_v1.03.pdf Page 84 [4] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R4.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3... Page 42 [5] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R4.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3... Page 38 [6] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R4.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3... Page 38
- pmontra 5y agoI wonder if governments quietly talk the companies behind the mainstream consumer OSes (Windows, Android, iOS and macOS) and components (I'm thinking about the device drivers) into not to try too hard to make them invulnerable to attacks. They can do all sort of subtle and not too subtle things to companies that cost them more money than they can lose because of zero days and zero clicks. After all nearly everybody has a phone that NSO could spy into and we didn't go back to Nokia 3310.