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No, he's asking how to fit the data we do observe, and why QM is the obvious conclusion compared to other theories that fit the data that we do observe.
by platz 5y ago
No, he's asking how to fit the data we do observe, and why QM is the obvious conclusion compared to other theories that fit the data that we do observe.
- breuleux 5y agoWhat other theories fit the data that we do observe?
- platz 5y agoThat's the counterfactual Scott is asking us to consider. See this comment for elaboration on exactly what kind of relevance rhis counterfactual has for QM https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30117928 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30117928
- breuleux 5y agoI'm not a fan of the teleological angle I'm seeing here. The universe doesn't serve a purpose, it's not doing a "job", any level of complexity is needless. Putting that misgiving aside, I think I get what you're saying (correct me if I'm wrong): the question is whether the "simpler" or at least more naive classical rules of physics could be the foundation for a world that looks and feels exactly like ours, e.g. one that forms a substance that has the precise properties of water, one that can support a stable form of DNA with which to assemble living beings, and so on. The answer to that depends on how far exactly you are willing to depart from perfect fidelity. To put it another way: what is exactly the set of invariants that you aim to preserve from QM to classical? Do you need them to be exactly the same? Probably not feasible. Do you want water to behave exactly the same? I would tend to say it couldn't. Do you want it to have stars? To be able to evolve humanoids? To be able to evolve life? These are all interesting questions on their own, but they may all have separate answers.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agothis is absolutely not what he is asking. his questions explicitly say to take QM as a given, but then move on to "why couldn't the universe be some other way?" He is not asking about other theories to explain the data we have; he is asking whether a substantively similar universe could have conceivably been built without QM.
- platz 5y ago> he is asking whether a substantively similar universe could have conceivably been built without QM. thats what I wrote QM must be the obvious conclusion (compared to X)
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoBut he's not asking whether or not QM is the obvious conclusion when trying to explain the data we have. He's asking why a creator/creation process would use QM in a universe rather than something else.
- platz 5y ago2 sides of the same question. its a special case of the cases described here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30117928 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30117928.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoI don't think so. Here's Scott from further down his own comment section: > Most importantly, people keep wanting to justify QM by reminding me about specific difficulties with the classical physics of the 19th century: for example, the ultraviolet catastrophe. To clarify, I never had any quarrel with the claim that, starting with 19th-century physics (especially electromagnetism), QM provided the only sensible completion. But, to say it one more time, what would’ve been wrong with a totally different starting point—let’s say, a classical cellular automaton? Sure, it wouldn’t lead to our physics, but it would lead to some physics that was computationally universal and presumably able to support complex life (at least, until I see a good argument otherwise).