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In a pure sense don't think so in this case since it's a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, would love to be wrong about that though. For a more practical ap
by zamadatix 5y ago
In a pure sense don't think so in this case since it's a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, would love to be wrong about that though. For a more practical approach though get your copy of the unique zero-knowledge proof signed by a trusted source first and that should do. Could be a trusted 3rd party or even a large blockchain. Or just switch to interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the first place.
- pepesza 5y agoThere are multiple ways of pulling this off. Signatures are zk-proof systems, just a very specialized ones. So you do it every time you sign a message. See my other comment on how it can be done.
- zamadatix 5y agoBut doesn't that make it no longer non-interactive?
- pepesza 5y agoWhy would it? Both signatures and snarks are non-interactive. And since you prove any(*) computation with a snark, you can prove that computation that verifies something (signature or snark proof) went well.
- zamadatix 5y agoWithout the interactive check imagine the real finder crewtes a self signed version of "42" for 2020. Shortly after an fake finder creates a new document with the exact same contents "42" dated 2019 and self signed. There is no interactive way of verifying which was truly the original here, you'd need to bring in a trusted 3rd party (or have already trusted one of the signers over the other in the first place) which is an interactive verification step (and actually measures when it was validated with 3rd party not truly when it was discovered).
- pepesza 5y agoI think we are talking about three different scenarios. You are describing attribution problem. "Solution to the puzzle is no longer a secret, it is a public knowledge. Who was the original finder?". This problem is not really concerned with the proof - there is nothing more to hide, milk has been spilled. GP is speaking about a different problem. Thief is not stealing the secret - they are stealing the proof that secret exists. In GP's scenario thief hacks GP's machine - which is not necessary, since GP is likely to show the proof to the world himself. > That means if someone snoops my machine and tries to use my proof to claim that they know the answer, I can spot it as a stolen proof. However, without revealing the treasure, I wouldn't be able to prove that they stole it, because it is equally possible that I stole it from them. And I was specifically addressing the situation when GP has made proof public. In such scenario thief can point the finger at the proof and claim that they have produced it. Solution described by me prevents thief from doing it, since proof will contain a public key from a keypair thief does not possess. Here is other poster, presenting the solution I spoke of in a clearer way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30094271 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30094271
- zamadatix 5y ago> You are describing attribution problem. "Solution to the puzzle is no longer a secret, it is a public knowledge. Who was the original finder?". Not at all, though perhaps my choice of "42" was poor as that seems to be an actual answer to one of the examples used here. "42" was meant as a dummy proof of knowledge value, not the secret value. My bad, should have picked something more obvious. > GP is speaking about a different problem. Thief is not stealing the secret - they are stealing the proof that secret exists. In GP's scenario thief hacks GP's machine - which is not necessary, since GP is likely to show the proof to the world himself. Yes, this is the scenario I'm exclusively referring to. > And I was specifically addressing the situation when GP has made proof public. In such scenario thief can point the finger at the proof and claim that they have produced it. Solution described by me prevents thief from doing it, since proof will contain a public key from a keypair thief does not possess. Your solution gives proof the person claiming to have found the proof signed their copy of the proof before the time it was shared, it doesn't prevent a 2nd person from taking the ZKP that was signed, making a new copy of it's value (not signature history), and signing it as an original signed ZK proof and claiming to have found it even earlier. The only ways I know of to detect such forgery of an original signed document occurred all involve interactivity (which makes the problem trivial). > Here is other poster, presenting the solution I spoke of in a clearer way: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30094271 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30094271 Embedding the user's public key in the ZKP process is also an interactive ZKP method, as above interactive verifications are trivial and there are many ways. The example site here uses non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs via zk-SNARK and that's where the open question left in my original comment lay.