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> Neither party can offer a valid argument as to why their principle is true, because both of their principles are normative. Can you offer a valid argument fo
by skissane 5y ago
> Neither party can offer a valid argument as to why their principle is true, because both of their principles are normative.
Can you offer a valid argument for the truth of your own principle, that it is impossible to offer a valid argument for the truth of any normative principle? I think your own position is a normative principle, and hence your position is self-refuting.
To call an argument "valid" is to make a normative claim; it is to claim that a rational agent ought to accept it. To call an argument invalid is to claim that a rational agent ought not accept it. Rationality has as much oughtness as morality does, and hence is a normative discipline just as morality is.
- burrows 5y agoThank you for prompting me to reevaluate my position. Initially I claimed, “There are no valid arguments for normative claims.”, I would like to amend my claim. Def: An inferential system is a tuple of axioms and inferential rules. Def: An argument is a non-empty ordered sequence of statements. The last statement is called its conclusion. Claim: If an inferential system produces an argument for a normative claim, the system is either inconsistent or permits inference from positive statements to normative statements or the argument proceeds from normative axioms. Proof. Suppose S is a consistent inferential system and that A is an argument in S from S’s axioms to a normative conclusion. If S has only positive axioms then A makes inference from positive to normative statements. QED Corollary: There are no arguments for normative claims that don’t proceed from normative axioms in consistent systems that don’t permit inference from normative to positive statements.
- skissane 5y agoYou are saying that, a valid deductive argument with a normative conclusion must either have a normative premise, or else rely on a logic whose inference rules permit normative statements to be inferred from non-normative ones. I agree with you there. But you haven't explained how this (obviously true) statement is relevant to the original discussion, about the morality of providing life-saving medical treatment to perpetrators of serious crimes.
- burrows 5y ago> But you haven't explained how this (obviously true) statement is relevant to the original discussion, about the morality of providing life-saving medical treatment to perpetrators of serious crimes. My original point was in response to the claim that “the key principle in medicine is to treat anyone who is sick, regardless of who they are”. I took this to be an ought and wanted to point out that its truth isn’t established anymore than the ought indicated by Ed’s family, and that in fact there would be serious difficulties with establishing either one for the reason given by your last post: > a valid deductive argument with a normative conclusion must either have a normative premise, or else rely on a logic whose inference rules permit normative statements to be inferred from non-normative ones. But also I think that this poster makes a good point that the doctors are actually making a positive claim. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30081152 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30081152 > To call an argument "valid" is to make a normative claim; it is to claim that a rational agent ought to accept it. I think I had in mind a textbook definition I had read. An argument is called valid if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. And then we say that an argument is sound if it is both valid and has true premises. Which seems like a useful pair of definitions, and in that context I was confused about the terms. I actually haven’t ever thought about or heard of this idea of ‘when is a rational actor committed to accepting claims’. But yeah, seems interesting to me.
- skissane 5y agoThat textbook definition of “valid” only applies to purely deductive arguments. Outside of mathematics, most arguments humans make have a significant non-deductive component (inductive and/or abductive). So, unless we assume that moral reasoning is closer to mathematical reasoning than to the kinds of reasoning we normally use in the sciences and humanities-a very dubious assumption-the formal concept of “validity” you are invoking has rather limited relevance to morality. That’s why I read your statement as intending “valid” informally rather than formally, since in its informal sense the term is not restricted to purely deductive arguments; and informally it is very much a normative concept (formally, I think it has multiple formal senses, some of which contain more normativity than others) I think your overall point is, you are expressing scepticism about claims to know the truth of some particular moral proposition, grounded in a more general scepticism of the possibility of any moral knowledge at all. I think that kind of general moral scepticism is (usually) a form of normative scepticism. The big problem I see with normative scepticism, is that attempts to argue for it logically and rationally turn out to be self-refuting, because logic and rationality are themselves normative concepts. Furthermore, if one understands knowledge as having a normative component, normative scepticism collapses into radical scepticism (there is no such thing as knowledge), which obviously ought to be rejected.
- bawolff 5y agoNot being able to use emperical evidence to prove a normative claim is a very common (albeit not universal) belief. Probably because nobody has really convincingly done so in thoussands of years. > To call an argument "valid" is to make a normative claim; it is to claim that a rational agent ought to accept it. Idk, it could just be a claim that the argument can be expressed in a logical system, combined with the normative axiom that rational agents should only trust arguments that can be validly expressed in such a formal system. Regardless this seems to be missing the forest for the trees. Nobody has put forth any arguments for either position that are emperical in nature. Is there really a practical difference between impossible and possible but nobody knows how?
- jlawson 5y agoThe practical/empirical argument would essentially be to extrapolate out what the world will become like if we spread X or Y normative belief/practice. You can argue that one will lead to a preferable world than the other. Of course, we may have different preferences, so we may not agree even if we agree on that extrapolation. But often basic human preferences like not wanting to be the victim of unprovoked public violence do align.
- skissane 5y agoConsider this (meta-)moral principle: For some moral proposition P, if universal human obedience to P would lead to human extinction, then P is false. Example of application: Consider "It is always immoral to have children". Obviously, if humanity universally obeyed that principle, human extinction would inevitably and quickly follow. Therefore, that principle is false. From which obviously follows: "It is moral to have children (at least sometimes)". Now, I would propose we accept that meta-moral principle as an axiom. To me, and to many others, it seems self-evidently and intuitively true. Who seriously doubts or denies this axiom? Well, most of the people who doubt or deny it, do so not due to its specific content, but due to a philosophical objection to accepting any moral axioms at all. The number of people who are happy to accept moral axioms but would refuse to accept this particular one appears to be rather small. It seems as good a candidate to be an axiom as any other. So why not accept it as an axiom?