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As a highly anti-Putin Russian, Putin's the game is very clear. He has fixed costs of having a standing army, which he pays for anyway. It is no difference for

As a highly anti-Putin Russian, Putin's the game is very clear. He has fixed costs of having a standing army, which he pays for anyway. It is no difference for him whether they are placed in Murmansk or in Crimea, the costs are the same. However, the benefits for him are different: it turns out that when these troops are stationed near the Ukraine border, the West loses their nerve and concedes to almost anything Putin wants. Imagine a thug standing nearby, playing with his brass knuckles menacingly. A skinny college boy gets really nervous and tries his best not to provoke the thug. Seeing the Russia situation from inside, I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests. However, the West is unable to read this game and Putin plays the incapable leaders of the Europe and the US really well.

vanusa 5y ago
I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests. Clearly it won't be in his interest. But if the West does not provide him with some major concessions -- will he do it anyway? To protect his image, or whatever? That seems to be the key question here.
grey-area 5y ago
Well it does serve a few goals: * Fulfils his old goal of expanding Russia to old soviet borders (see Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea etc). * Distracts from internal problems with an external enemy (a tried and true tactic of dictators) * Provides a buffer from Nato and Europe (long a preoccupation) The bet here is that the West will do nothing if he takes Ukraine. Given the current messaging from the US and Germany (Embassy evacuations, disposition of fleet, Biden slipup Fri, 5000 troops), he's probably right. You don't move this many troops and ships etc as a feint (nor would you need to), the die is already cast, and the only uncertainty is what the West will do about it IMO - at present it looks like not much, as they didn't do much about Crimea. Worst case for Putin is a long war which bleeds the country of money and resources, so he'll want it over quickly and a puppet ruler installed, at which point he can withdraw and plan to slowly absorb the Ukraine or leave it as a satellite state like Belarus.
- Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
  The die is not cast at all. Troops can move within Russia back and forth without problems, there are no obligations to give an attack order just because the troops are standing near the border. There is no too much risks to his internal image, because according to propaganda he is fighting for peace and does not want to attack at all. I think that Putin has lost a chance to grab the eastern Ukraine in 2014. When Yanukovich fled Kiev, he could have made him ask for a military help, and in the post-maidan chaos could take everything east of Dnepr, creating a puppet state loyal to a legitimately elected president, and then slowly incorporate those territories into russia over the next few years or decades. Also, do not equate Chechnya, Georgia and Crimea. Chechnya was an internal region with no international recognition ever, so this is an internal matter, and it's not so much 'grabbing territory' as 'restoring order'. Taking territory from Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, etc is a different matter and is seen by state propaganda as bringing the rightful territory back into the fold.
  - grey-area 5y ago
    While I agree each unhappy subject state is unhappy in its own way, the examples of Chechnya, Crimea and Georgia all show in different ways how machiavellian Putin is - anything goes and the lives of others (including his own citizens) simply don’t matter if he thinks he will get away with it. I think given the public statements demanding absurd terms from the west and the very public troop movements Putin would now find it very hard to back down.
    - Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
      Both Chechen wars have started before Putin came to power. And both were lost by Russia, actually. Russia just picked one of many rivalling clans and pays tribute to them. So no, it's not Machiavellian, more like a gopnik who stole a TV set while the neighbors were putting out a fire in their house.
  - fer 5y ago
    > Also, do not equate Chechnya, Georgia and Crimea. Of course you can equate. Russia has a history of supporting separatists immediately outside of their borders, while cracking them down when they're just across inside. You can directly compare their completely opposed stances in North and South Ossetia. Russia created what I call Schrodinger's jihadists: you can't know if someone is a terrorist or a freedom fighter until you observe on which side of the border they are and the threat function collapses. Basayev in Abkhazia? Good. Basayev in Chechnya? Bad.
xg15 5y ago
Right now, Russia's official communication also seems contradictory (at least what you hear in the West of it) On the one hand, they claim any talk about an invasion is absurd hyperbole, on the other hand they demand security guarantees or else. Or else what? Like, if an invasion won't happen under any circumstances, then what exactly are they threatening to do if the demands are not met?
- Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
  Or else they'll be caught bluffing. But so far it looks like this bluff is working. Also, Biden's "minor incursion is one thing" remarks kinda opens the door to explore this "thing" a bit further.
deepsun 5y ago
> I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests Last time (Crimea 2014) it greatly improved Putin political position within Russia.
- Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
  The euphoria has certainly worn off by now. Also, the annexation of the Crimea was essentially bloodless - the Ukrainian army just left with their pot flowers and cardboard boxes in hands. If there will be real fighting, war fatigue will catch up really fast. War in Chechnya was extremely unpopular in Russia.
mcntsh 5y ago
> It is no difference for him whether they are placed in Murmansk or in Crimea, the costs are the same This makes no sense. Of course it costs money to move troops, resources, and cargo thousands of kilometers. > I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests Besides the obvious goal of combating NATO expansion and taking control of the Black Sea, isn't Ukraine also sort of a threat to Russia? You've got a country with soldiers less than 800km from Moscow that is cozying up to the West and developing ICBM technology. From a military strategy perspective it makes sense to turn it back into a buffer zone.

vanusa 5y ago

I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests. Clearly it won't be in his interest. But if the West does not provide him with some major concessions -- will he do it anyway? To protect his image, or whatever? That seems to be the key question here.

grey-area 5y ago

Well it does serve a few goals: * Fulfils his old goal of expanding Russia to old soviet borders (see Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea etc). * Distracts from internal problems with an external enemy (a tried and true tactic of dictators) * Provides a buffer from Nato and Europe (long a preoccupation) The bet here is that the West will do nothing if he takes Ukraine. Given the current messaging from the US and Germany (Embassy evacuations, disposition of fleet, Biden slipup Fri, 5000 troops), he's probably right. You don't move this many troops and ships etc as a feint (nor would you need to), the die is already cast, and the only uncertainty is what the West will do about it IMO - at present it looks like not much, as they didn't do much about Crimea. Worst case for Putin is a long war which bleeds the country of money and resources, so he'll want it over quickly and a puppet ruler installed, at which point he can withdraw and plan to slowly absorb the Ukraine or leave it as a satellite state like Belarus.

Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
The die is not cast at all. Troops can move within Russia back and forth without problems, there are no obligations to give an attack order just because the troops are standing near the border. There is no too much risks to his internal image, because according to propaganda he is fighting for peace and does not want to attack at all. I think that Putin has lost a chance to grab the eastern Ukraine in 2014. When Yanukovich fled Kiev, he could have made him ask for a military help, and in the post-maidan chaos could take everything east of Dnepr, creating a puppet state loyal to a legitimately elected president, and then slowly incorporate those territories into russia over the next few years or decades. Also, do not equate Chechnya, Georgia and Crimea. Chechnya was an internal region with no international recognition ever, so this is an internal matter, and it's not so much 'grabbing territory' as 'restoring order'. Taking territory from Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, etc is a different matter and is seen by state propaganda as bringing the rightful territory back into the fold.
- grey-area 5y ago
  While I agree each unhappy subject state is unhappy in its own way, the examples of Chechnya, Crimea and Georgia all show in different ways how machiavellian Putin is - anything goes and the lives of others (including his own citizens) simply don’t matter if he thinks he will get away with it. I think given the public statements demanding absurd terms from the west and the very public troop movements Putin would now find it very hard to back down.
  - Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
    Both Chechen wars have started before Putin came to power. And both were lost by Russia, actually. Russia just picked one of many rivalling clans and pays tribute to them. So no, it's not Machiavellian, more like a gopnik who stole a TV set while the neighbors were putting out a fire in their house.
- fer 5y ago
  > Also, do not equate Chechnya, Georgia and Crimea. Of course you can equate. Russia has a history of supporting separatists immediately outside of their borders, while cracking them down when they're just across inside. You can directly compare their completely opposed stances in North and South Ossetia. Russia created what I call Schrodinger's jihadists: you can't know if someone is a terrorist or a freedom fighter until you observe on which side of the border they are and the threat function collapses. Basayev in Abkhazia? Good. Basayev in Chechnya? Bad.

xg15 5y ago

Right now, Russia's official communication also seems contradictory (at least what you hear in the West of it) On the one hand, they claim any talk about an invasion is absurd hyperbole, on the other hand they demand security guarantees or else. Or else what? Like, if an invasion won't happen under any circumstances, then what exactly are they threatening to do if the demands are not met?

Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
Or else they'll be caught bluffing. But so far it looks like this bluff is working. Also, Biden's "minor incursion is one thing" remarks kinda opens the door to explore this "thing" a bit further.

deepsun 5y ago

> I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests Last time (Crimea 2014) it greatly improved Putin political position within Russia.

Andrew_nenakhov 5y ago
The euphoria has certainly worn off by now. Also, the annexation of the Crimea was essentially bloodless - the Ukrainian army just left with their pot flowers and cardboard boxes in hands. If there will be real fighting, war fatigue will catch up really fast. War in Chechnya was extremely unpopular in Russia.

mcntsh 5y ago

> It is no difference for him whether they are placed in Murmansk or in Crimea, the costs are the same This makes no sense. Of course it costs money to move troops, resources, and cargo thousands of kilometers. > I don't see how this new war is in Putin's interests Besides the obvious goal of combating NATO expansion and taking control of the Black Sea, isn't Ukraine also sort of a threat to Russia? You've got a country with soldiers less than 800km from Moscow that is cozying up to the West and developing ICBM technology. From a military strategy perspective it makes sense to turn it back into a buffer zone.