4 ms·
Then you only have a 1/N chance of capturing affected traffic, where N is the (fairly large) number of entry or exit nodes. Also, Tor changes which entry and e
by koenigdavidmj 15y ago
Then you only have a 1/N chance of capturing affected traffic, where N is the (fairly large) number of entry or exit nodes.
Also, Tor changes which entry and exit nodes you use on occasion (about every few minutes, if I recall).
- ch0wn 15y agoAlso, if you communicate through properly encrypted protocols, the exit node won't get anything interesting to see.
- mike-cardwell 15y agoWhich is easier said than done. For web traffic, the site has to use https for everything. Secondly, the site has to secure their cookies from being sent over http, either by using HSTS with the includeSubDomains flag, or the "secure" cookie flag. Thirdly, you have to assume that the exit node isn't using a forged certificate from a compromised CA. Fourthly, you have to assume that the entity running the exit node doesn't have a zero day vulnerability for your browser, which they can deliver to you as soon as you make any http request to any site.
- mike-cardwell 15y agoThe Tor client selects a small list of "Entry Guards" and uses only them as entry nodes. I think this change was made two-three years ago. This was done to prevent the problem whereby anyone using Tor for long enough would eventually connect to all entry nodes, allowing anyone else to set up an entry node to gather a list of most of the persistent Tor users.