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> From what I gather(ed) the root problem was the lack of winterization to [all] energy infrastructure. This is mostly the case. The primary issue wasn't that

> From what I gather(ed) the root problem was the lack of winterization to [all] energy infrastructure. This is mostly the case. The primary issue wasn't that generation infrastructure wasn't weatherized, it's that wind turbines were not properly weatherized and failed, and the NG peaker infrastructure /was/ weatherized and took over, but was having issues meeting demands because the NG well infrastructure was not weatherized, meaning the peaker plants couldn't draw enough gas to meet demands. Another major confounding factor during the snowstorm was that grid didn't have enough high voltage pathways to support the amount of power that had to be shifted between generation locations and the generation locations were too spread out regionally (Texas is a large and mostly empty state) to maintain grid stability, so there was forced load shedding to prevent phase shifting out of spec or grid islanding. Also, while we're at it, it's bullshit when people say that "Republicans deregulated power in Texas, which is why it has an independent grid." Texas has ALWAYS had an independent grid. When the national grid started forming in response to New Deal legislation in 1935 states could avoid being affected by federal regulations by not transmitting power across state lines, so Texas chose to not connect its existing grid to the national grid as it was forming. Originally Texas had two independent grids, but they joined during that time, choosing to remain disconnected from the national grid but sharing with each other. ERCOT was actually formed to begin internal regulations of power in Texas in response to a huge national power disaster in 1965 that didn't affect Texas, but made the state realize it needed /some/ regulation. I don't make any judgements as to whether this situation is better or worse, and it was certainly politically motivated, but it's not new and it's not recent, so most of the things written about it are simply untrue.

mindslight 5y ago
I agree with your objective points. But one thing your narrative leaves out is that there were power shortages creating long outages causing substantial damage, regardless of what end users ended up paying. The media latched onto the spot price and Griddy customers because they love red herring sensationalism, but regardless of the media's disinformative narrative there still was a massive market failure here. It was just felt mainly through infrastructure collapse rather than price gouging.
- tristor 5y ago
  > But one thing your narrative leaves out is that there were power shortages creating long outages causing substantial damage, Sure, this is true. That was never in dispute though, so I didn't address it. I don't think I have a "narrative". I'm just tired of every single thread about what happened last February in Texas turning into an opportunity for everybody to get their political kicks in on the basis of lies and twists. That behavior does exactly nothing to solve any of the problems identified, and it stokes feelings of undeserved self-righteousness. The power shortages could have been avoided had wind generation been properly weatherized and had we had properly weatherized gas wells to supply the peaker plants. Neither of those things were true, and therefore this situation occurred. So far, we seem to have improved generation weatherization since, but the wells are still not weatherized, so it's possible this situation (or something similar) could occur again. It remains to be seen.
  - mindslight 5y ago
    I just meant 'narrative' as a tying together of facts and corresponding synthesis - an inherent thing rather than a bad thing. I do think the market failure here is a bit political, in that it's market fundamentalism to rely solely on spot prices, falling back to wishful thinking that short periods of extremely high prices will somehow incentivize new investment into the market. That decision to not have a capacity market is definitely a political one. Agreed on the physical things that need to happen to prevent this from reoccurring, but the question is how to get those things implemented. A strong regulated market would just declare that they need to be done, and ignore the protests of how burdensome they are. Whereas a deregulated market dynamic really needs a forward capacity market or some other incentive for plants to do the preparation for staying online. And this applies to both the electricity and natural gas markets.
    - tristor 5y ago
      Unfortunately reality is more complex than we would like it to be. You're correct that a proper capacity market would likely have mitigated much of this issue, on the flip side capacity markets in other regions/grids are a major driver behind continued coal power generation as coal is the lowest cost type of generation for capacity markets. The lack of a capacity market in Texas is not motivated by environmental concerns, but nonetheless if such a capacity market were created in Texas it would likely be detrimental to the environment given the current overall incentive structure. The bigger issue is that ERCOT /has/ made a regulation saying generators need to weatherize, which they have done so and been inspected and verified. But ERCOT can't control the natural gas producers, and they have thus far mostly refused to weatherize their wellheads, and therefore we may once again find that we can't drive peaker generation high enough to meet demand due to inadequate natural gas supply pressure. The oil & gas industry and electrical utilities are regulated independently in Texas, although they are often considered to be the same as "the energy sector", and so there is definitely more that can/should be done here. I guess we'll see how it pans out. With better weatherized renewables, it's likely we won't see this situation re-occur. There was plenty of wind blowing during the crisis, so had the wind turbines been properly weatherized we wouldn't have needed as much peaker capacity anyway.

mindslight 5y ago

I agree with your objective points. But one thing your narrative leaves out is that there were power shortages creating long outages causing substantial damage, regardless of what end users ended up paying. The media latched onto the spot price and Griddy customers because they love red herring sensationalism, but regardless of the media's disinformative narrative there still was a massive market failure here. It was just felt mainly through infrastructure collapse rather than price gouging.

tristor 5y ago
> But one thing your narrative leaves out is that there were power shortages creating long outages causing substantial damage, Sure, this is true. That was never in dispute though, so I didn't address it. I don't think I have a "narrative". I'm just tired of every single thread about what happened last February in Texas turning into an opportunity for everybody to get their political kicks in on the basis of lies and twists. That behavior does exactly nothing to solve any of the problems identified, and it stokes feelings of undeserved self-righteousness. The power shortages could have been avoided had wind generation been properly weatherized and had we had properly weatherized gas wells to supply the peaker plants. Neither of those things were true, and therefore this situation occurred. So far, we seem to have improved generation weatherization since, but the wells are still not weatherized, so it's possible this situation (or something similar) could occur again. It remains to be seen.
- mindslight 5y ago
  I just meant 'narrative' as a tying together of facts and corresponding synthesis - an inherent thing rather than a bad thing. I do think the market failure here is a bit political, in that it's market fundamentalism to rely solely on spot prices, falling back to wishful thinking that short periods of extremely high prices will somehow incentivize new investment into the market. That decision to not have a capacity market is definitely a political one. Agreed on the physical things that need to happen to prevent this from reoccurring, but the question is how to get those things implemented. A strong regulated market would just declare that they need to be done, and ignore the protests of how burdensome they are. Whereas a deregulated market dynamic really needs a forward capacity market or some other incentive for plants to do the preparation for staying online. And this applies to both the electricity and natural gas markets.
  - tristor 5y ago
    Unfortunately reality is more complex than we would like it to be. You're correct that a proper capacity market would likely have mitigated much of this issue, on the flip side capacity markets in other regions/grids are a major driver behind continued coal power generation as coal is the lowest cost type of generation for capacity markets. The lack of a capacity market in Texas is not motivated by environmental concerns, but nonetheless if such a capacity market were created in Texas it would likely be detrimental to the environment given the current overall incentive structure. The bigger issue is that ERCOT /has/ made a regulation saying generators need to weatherize, which they have done so and been inspected and verified. But ERCOT can't control the natural gas producers, and they have thus far mostly refused to weatherize their wellheads, and therefore we may once again find that we can't drive peaker generation high enough to meet demand due to inadequate natural gas supply pressure. The oil & gas industry and electrical utilities are regulated independently in Texas, although they are often considered to be the same as "the energy sector", and so there is definitely more that can/should be done here. I guess we'll see how it pans out. With better weatherized renewables, it's likely we won't see this situation re-occur. There was plenty of wind blowing during the crisis, so had the wind turbines been properly weatherized we wouldn't have needed as much peaker capacity anyway.