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The recent scmp report (i.e. info PRC wants to leak) on IR sensor development for hypersonic implies they're considering hypersonic AA to directly engage 5th ge

The recent scmp report (i.e. info PRC wants to leak) on IR sensor development for hypersonic implies they're considering hypersonic AA to directly engage 5th gen fighters. Previously it was hypersonic drones to intercept 5th gen and engaging with normal AA missiles. >indistinguishable to strategic ballistic missile ... >completely useless in war time because they look exactly like launching a nuke and you can't know in advance they're not. They're useful and will be used because US will necessarily be compelled to adopt second strike posture, knowing PRC will use conventional IR/CBMs, if such capabilities are demonstrated to be credible. Especially if PRC backs up with massive nuclear retaliation (which she's building as we speak). Reality right now is that every standoff US weapon from tomhawks to other conventional ordnance can all be nuclear tipped and are already indistinguishable from nuclear attacks for US adversaries. There's no reason PRC or any adversary capable of nuclear retaliation should give any major US platforms a benefit of a doubt - Arleigh Burkes, Ohio SSGN, B2/Lancers from AF global strike etc - they're all capable of nuclear delivery. But benefit of a doubt is necessarily extended by merely knowing US has conventional options, that will be used per doctrine, with massive nuclear retaliatory capabilities. They must wait and posture for second strike. Hence why PRC is now conducting nuke buildup to force US into adopting second strike in response to rapid PRC advanced in conventional capabilities. Current PRC rocket force doctrine is absolutely to saturate US carrier groups with IRBMs. And it looks like eventually this will apply to conventional ICBM/hypersonics, i.e. prompt global strike capabilities once accuracy is sufficient, as per SCMP article on being able to hit "all" critical countries / strike with "strategic depth" so traditional warfare no longer exists. That means hitting CONUS as an option if US ever thinks about hitting PRC soil.

XorNot 5y ago
If you use a weapon which is launched from a land base like a ballistic missile and is indomitable against a bunch of targets with conventional weapons, then your adversary is not going to sit back and lose aircraft carriers to it - they're going to target the launch sites. They may not be able to hit those sites with non-ballistic weapons. Which means, you've created a situation where they face conventional defeat because you're implicitly trying to use your nuclear deterrent to protect a conventional asset - but how are you supposed to know the ballistic response headed for your mainland isn't nuclear and isn't targeting your cities?
- dirtyid 5y ago
  >implicitly trying to use your nuclear deterrent to protect a conventional asset That's the point and what US does already. Flip situation around, PRC conventional and nuclear infra is deliberately entangled to deter conventional attacks, but US planning may still attempt to hit these targets anyway. There's enough think tank papers out there that presumes US will attack targets on PRC soil with the unspoken assumption that PRC will be a rational actor and not launch on warning to indomitable standoff attacks launched from US delivery vehicles indistinguishable from strategic platforms. So why wouldn't PRC launch on warning from these type of attacks (apart from alleged no first use)? Because US has overwhelming second strike capability and even if PRC can rationalize US strike as conventional, ultimately they don't know for sure and is resigned to wait for determination regardless. Maybe they'll have ABM to intercept or try to shoot a few AA or conduct ASW in the meantime in anticipation that attack was conventional, but those are the conventional actions the escalation ladder affords. The point is precisely to calibrate costs and resign decision making to second strike anyway. Structure deterrence and nuclear doctrine weapons so launch on warning becomes unthinkable to create escalation environment that allows conventional ir/cbm use. Hence PRC no first strike policy, and nuclear build up for credible second strike, and rocket force doctrine that they _will_ use conventional ir/icbms in force on force scenarios. All developments to spell out that PRC will definitely be using these hypersonic platforms, so work that into the strategic game theory. Otherwise why have such conventional capabilities in the first place? They're not for show just like US conventional capabilities aren't.
  - XorNot 5y ago
    Because conventional capabilities don't matter if they're indistinguishable from nuclear capabilities till they impact. Or put it another way: China launching a hypersonic kill vehicle at a US carrier is pretty much indistinguishable to China launching a tactical nuke at one. Their launch and flight profiles are identical, and while fallout is an issue, the use of a battlefield nuclear weapon wouldn't actually warrant a strategic nuclear response. From a US perspective, the issue is they lost a carrier because the nuke is going off in Chinese waters in your scenario. But the problem is that launch is a ballistic missile. The only actual defense is that launching 1 doesn't look like a strategic nuclear strike. But let's pretend for a moment you're somehow using these in air defense: you'd be launching hundreds and there's no way to know while you have eyes that they're not a strategic strike. The PRC won't launch - or hopefully doesn't launch - in a conventional war because the counterstrike would definitely kill them. Same reason the US doesn't. You can de-escalate a conventional war, but you can't de-escalate strategic missile launches at cities. You can quite happily today roll out onto the battlefield and start slinging artillery fired nukes and it would be a big deal but not warrant strategic nuclear response because everyone is only in danger of losing their deployed forces, not their entire industrial base, population and environment.

XorNot 5y ago

If you use a weapon which is launched from a land base like a ballistic missile and is indomitable against a bunch of targets with conventional weapons, then your adversary is not going to sit back and lose aircraft carriers to it - they're going to target the launch sites. They may not be able to hit those sites with non-ballistic weapons. Which means, you've created a situation where they face conventional defeat because you're implicitly trying to use your nuclear deterrent to protect a conventional asset - but how are you supposed to know the ballistic response headed for your mainland isn't nuclear and isn't targeting your cities?

dirtyid 5y ago
>implicitly trying to use your nuclear deterrent to protect a conventional asset That's the point and what US does already. Flip situation around, PRC conventional and nuclear infra is deliberately entangled to deter conventional attacks, but US planning may still attempt to hit these targets anyway. There's enough think tank papers out there that presumes US will attack targets on PRC soil with the unspoken assumption that PRC will be a rational actor and not launch on warning to indomitable standoff attacks launched from US delivery vehicles indistinguishable from strategic platforms. So why wouldn't PRC launch on warning from these type of attacks (apart from alleged no first use)? Because US has overwhelming second strike capability and even if PRC can rationalize US strike as conventional, ultimately they don't know for sure and is resigned to wait for determination regardless. Maybe they'll have ABM to intercept or try to shoot a few AA or conduct ASW in the meantime in anticipation that attack was conventional, but those are the conventional actions the escalation ladder affords. The point is precisely to calibrate costs and resign decision making to second strike anyway. Structure deterrence and nuclear doctrine weapons so launch on warning becomes unthinkable to create escalation environment that allows conventional ir/cbm use. Hence PRC no first strike policy, and nuclear build up for credible second strike, and rocket force doctrine that they _will_ use conventional ir/icbms in force on force scenarios. All developments to spell out that PRC will definitely be using these hypersonic platforms, so work that into the strategic game theory. Otherwise why have such conventional capabilities in the first place? They're not for show just like US conventional capabilities aren't.
- XorNot 5y ago
  Because conventional capabilities don't matter if they're indistinguishable from nuclear capabilities till they impact. Or put it another way: China launching a hypersonic kill vehicle at a US carrier is pretty much indistinguishable to China launching a tactical nuke at one. Their launch and flight profiles are identical, and while fallout is an issue, the use of a battlefield nuclear weapon wouldn't actually warrant a strategic nuclear response. From a US perspective, the issue is they lost a carrier because the nuke is going off in Chinese waters in your scenario. But the problem is that launch is a ballistic missile. The only actual defense is that launching 1 doesn't look like a strategic nuclear strike. But let's pretend for a moment you're somehow using these in air defense: you'd be launching hundreds and there's no way to know while you have eyes that they're not a strategic strike. The PRC won't launch - or hopefully doesn't launch - in a conventional war because the counterstrike would definitely kill them. Same reason the US doesn't. You can de-escalate a conventional war, but you can't de-escalate strategic missile launches at cities. You can quite happily today roll out onto the battlefield and start slinging artillery fired nukes and it would be a big deal but not warrant strategic nuclear response because everyone is only in danger of losing their deployed forces, not their entire industrial base, population and environment.