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> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic: This is not true, and there are consistent interpretatio
by tsimionescu 5y ago
> However, we do know from Quantum Mechanics that the universe is probabilistic and not deterministic:
This is not true, and there are consistent interpretations of QM that are fully deterministic (many worlds, superdeterminism, pilot wave).
Still, probabilistic vs deterministic makes no difference. There is no free will in a throw of the dice, and no free will in the wave function collapse.
On the other hand, the main philosophical position on this is compatibilism: free will in a fully deterministic universe (or probabilistic one). If you think of yourself as the sum total of all your experiences and genetics, your next action is of course determined by these; but, another agent in your shoes, one with different experiences and genetics, would make a different choice. So in this framework, your choice, even though uniquely determined by everything that happened before, and theoretically predictable 1000 years in advance, is still meaningfully "your choice".
In fact, random chance hurts this definition, and weakens the case for compatibilism; if your next action is entirely dependent on some random quantum fluctuation, and running the experiment with your exact same experience and genetics but a different random quantum event at this exact time would produce 1000 entirely different actions on your part, then it is very hard to imagine any kind of free will. So, free will actually depends on some amount of determinism. Even the type of determinism in Many Worlds would not solve this - since in that interpretation, all possible outcomes of the quantum event actually happen, so all your "choices" that depend on the random event are fully real. So, if each of the fully real copies of you, with the exact same experiences and genetics, does a wildly different thing, then it's pretty clear there is no meaningful free will in any possible sense.
- SuoDuanDao 5y agoI find the most satisfying version of compatibilism one where an agent is mostly determined by 'state' (genes/experiences etc), but the subjective experience of expending mental effort (e.g. when overcoming an addiction) is the agent nudging the wave function collapse this way or that. Add in the ability to influence future 'states' and one has a model much more consistent with the subjective experience of making difficult choices.
- JackFr 5y agoOr you can just accept that reductive materialism is not an adequate description of the world.
- tsimionescu 5y agoIf only any other system of thought could make any kind of verifiable prediction, it would be wise to reject materialism. As it is though, you either have magical systems of thought, that reject the very framework of science; or ones which amount to materialism plus some handwaving.
- SuoDuanDao 5y agoOh I accept that, but I'm also wary of theories that seem to handwave material reality. I've found Dione Fortune's writings the most useful in that regard, though she can be... obscure. Quite influential all the same.
- astrange 5y agoDoes your non-materialist theory involve true randomness (which is not really making a decision), or is it just more mind-stuff behaving deterministically in another dimension (which is not really free will)? I'm not sure there are alternatives to these.
- tsimionescu 5y agoI think the standard position of free will non-compatibilists is that there is some dimension of mind whose future at any time T is not uniquely determined by its state at time T-1 (but it is influenced by that state, it's also not purely random). In this model, each agent possessing free will has a series of possible choices with "weights" for each choice pre-determined by the prior state of the agent (their history, their racial instincts etc). Which choice the agent will select cannot be known in advance. Usually it is implied that the agent has a resource of "will" that they must expend more of to select one of the choices with higher "weight". After the agent selects one particular choice, the universe proceeds deterministically (or probabilistically) until the next moment when an agent must make a choice. Whether this phenomenon is happening directly in material reality (the agent can influence wave function collapse or some other such idea) or it is happening in a separate world of mind/spirit and then there is some miraculous reconciliation of the two worlds is somewhat irrelevant.