Let me try an argument and you can rebut it for my own edification, I'm a younger brother so perhaps view this as an argument by a younger brother who is explor

Let me try an argument and you can rebut it for my own edification, I'm a younger brother so perhaps view this as an argument by a younger brother who is exploring half formed ideas and trying to engage an older brother so I can be proved wrong (my older brothers usually prove me wrong irl): Is it ideological to say that discrete minds have equality of type? If one then says discrete minds with equality are logically treated with equality of type. Is that not a properly basic truth? 1+1 equaling 2 can be argued against (can't evrything) but the onus is on those who argue that 1+1 equals not 2. Is basic counting ideological? Are all 1's not the same? Would it be strange to treat a 1 as if some particular 1 does not equal 1 or is a superior 1. I think definitions of 1 would have to be tortured to do so. I'm not saying what 1 ought to do, I'm just saying form follows function, a tree is not equal to a wheel, they do not share similar form or function. What moral argument does one have for a particular mind to forcibly coerce another mind. What argument is there for a greater 1? This seems like this would no longer be describing the way reality is but the way someone views it "ought" to be. I guess one could argue that minds don't have equality on the whole, but I think the burden of proof would have to fall on the person making such a claim. Maybe through the measurements of skull shape someone has irrefutably identified a superior qualia.