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Like I said earlier, you got fixated on your own understanding of what "good enough" means and didn't actually pay attention to what people were actually talkin

by shkkmo 5y ago

Like I said earlier, you got fixated on your own understanding of what "good enough" means and didn't actually pay attention to what people were actually talking about. Instead of learning something, you went on a diatribe and repeatedly misrepresented what people were actually saying. I've seen people adhere blindy to standards and I've seen people ignore standards without a good reason. Both are failure modes that can increase risks. I also think you are grossly simplifing what caused the engineering failures you mention. They have a lot more to do with systemic pressure and misplaced priorities than they do with engineers making contextual assements of risk beyond what is stipulated in the standards.

bumby 5y ago
I don't think I was misrepresenting. I think it just boils down to we both read the OP differently. It's possible to have different takes without it being ascribed to malice or deliberate misrepresentation. >I also think you are grossly simplifing what caused the engineering failures you mention. I don't know how you arrived at this conclusion? I am in no way simplifying. I said those types of systems are complex to the point that subjective determination of good enough isn't adequate and how standards help fill those gaps of understanding. I've literally worked on some of those systems and have had listened to people at the highest levels of some of those organizations about the nature of those failures. I've withheld approving plans of one because I witnessed firsthand how the nature of external pressure corrupts what is meant by "good enough". If you know more intimate details on any of those examples, I'm all ears. >They have a lot more to do with systemic pressure and misplaced priorities than they do with engineers making contextual assements of risk This is the exact point I've been making but I think the two are interwined. Those competing pressures make fertile ground for rationalization and cognitive bias to influence decisions to change the definition of good enough more in-line with the verbiage of the OP (again, there was no discussion of risk in that post, you shoehorned that into your interpretation. There was only discussion of clunky, stupid code which was blessed as good enough). You seem to imply risk understanding occurs in an objective vacuum and I disagree. That's why I think subjective determination of good enough falls short in some scenarios. I'm not sure if you've been so focused on being right that you've ignored that central point, or if I'm just not communicating it effectively but it's not really worth belaboring further.
- shkkmo 5y ago
  > It's possible to have different takes without it being ascribed to malice or deliberate misrepresentation. Which I did not do. I don't think you are doing it deliberately or I would have ended the conversation long ago. > You seem to imply risk understanding occurs in an objective vacuum and I disagree. Not at all, where do I imply that? It is actually the opposite. I am arguing against your position that risk assements should happen in a vacuum and be based purely on standards with no need or room for subjective reasoning. > again, there was no discussion of risk in that post, you shoehorned that into your interpretation While the top comment did not explicitly mention "risk", the comment or did reply to you saying: >> Isn't that by definition what good enough means? That on safety critical code "good enough" is a very different level than on a throwaway-script? > That's why I think subjective determination of good enough falls short in some scenarios. I've repeatedly said that subjective risk assessment is usually not enough: >> Standards and outside analysis are important, even in non-safety critical systems, but they are no substitute for a developer making careful assements of if code is good enough. >I'm not sure if you've been so focused on being right that you've ignored that central point, or if I'm just not communicating it effectively I think your communication issues or on the listening side as you keep projecting a strawman onto people rather than actually listening to what people are saying. But since we both appear to feel that the other one is not listening, that is probably a clue this conversation should end. I do encourage you to take some time carefully re-reading the thread to see if you can figure out why you seem to misinterpret so much of what people say.
  - bumby 5y ago
    What an odd and condescending take, even when try explaining to me the failure modes of a system I actually have firsthand experience with. Doesn't that seem like something that should give you pause to self-reflect? I understand your point. What you seem to be missing is that we're talking about two different things. I agree that decisions should be made in the context of the risk of the engineering application. That's trivially apparent to the point where it's almost confusing that you would feel the need to bring up up (ad nauseum). It's also not particularly interesting because just about everybody will agree with that. What I'm talking about is when people fall prey to cognitive biases to the point where they can no longer make accurate risk assessments. That's a much more interesting problem because the engineering world is full of cases where otherwise smart engineers make terrible judgement calls, all the while telling themselves that they understand the risk. I literally brought up cognitive biases in my first post and instead of responding to what I'm actually discussing, you just keep underscoring a trivially simple point. I think you're reading your own interpretation into what I'm trying to say and then somehow twisting it into being a miscommunication on my part. When I'm saying subjective judgement can lead to bad decisions, I am not saying "we take all the unique and contextual facts into consideration and arrive at a reasonable subjective risk assessment for this scenario". I'm saying people's cognitive biases can lead to them discounting risk without good evidence because it results in a decision they are emotionally attached to. E.g., "I don't want to miss schedule and look bad, so let's rationalize away this risk that really wasn't mitigated." That is not an objective risk-based decision, it's a biased emotional one. They may think it's "good enough" to get the job done, until it's not (as in the cases I specifically brought up). While I already explained it but it didn't seem to sink in, I'll reiterate one last time: You seem to say your definition of "good enough" is based on good, risk-based judgement. I already said if that's the case then we don't disagree. But I also said that is not the context that the term "good enough" is generally used in practice. In my experience, it's used to justify a sub-standard effort and I've given you concrete examples of that. That point of digression between what I'm saying and what you're interpreting seemed to fly right by you because you're more concerned with arguing, and there's some irony in you pointing out that someone else isn't listening.

by shkkmo 5y ago

bumby 5y ago

I don't think I was misrepresenting. I think it just boils down to we both read the OP differently. It's possible to have different takes without it being ascribed to malice or deliberate misrepresentation. >I also think you are grossly simplifing what caused the engineering failures you mention. I don't know how you arrived at this conclusion? I am in no way simplifying. I said those types of systems are complex to the point that subjective determination of good enough isn't adequate and how standards help fill those gaps of understanding. I've literally worked on some of those systems and have had listened to people at the highest levels of some of those organizations about the nature of those failures. I've withheld approving plans of one because I witnessed firsthand how the nature of external pressure corrupts what is meant by "good enough". If you know more intimate details on any of those examples, I'm all ears. >They have a lot more to do with systemic pressure and misplaced priorities than they do with engineers making contextual assements of risk This is the exact point I've been making but I think the two are interwined. Those competing pressures make fertile ground for rationalization and cognitive bias to influence decisions to change the definition of good enough more in-line with the verbiage of the OP (again, there was no discussion of risk in that post, you shoehorned that into your interpretation. There was only discussion of clunky, stupid code which was blessed as good enough). You seem to imply risk understanding occurs in an objective vacuum and I disagree. That's why I think subjective determination of good enough falls short in some scenarios. I'm not sure if you've been so focused on being right that you've ignored that central point, or if I'm just not communicating it effectively but it's not really worth belaboring further.

shkkmo 5y ago
> It's possible to have different takes without it being ascribed to malice or deliberate misrepresentation. Which I did not do. I don't think you are doing it deliberately or I would have ended the conversation long ago. > You seem to imply risk understanding occurs in an objective vacuum and I disagree. Not at all, where do I imply that? It is actually the opposite. I am arguing against your position that risk assements should happen in a vacuum and be based purely on standards with no need or room for subjective reasoning. > again, there was no discussion of risk in that post, you shoehorned that into your interpretation While the top comment did not explicitly mention "risk", the comment or did reply to you saying: >> Isn't that by definition what good enough means? That on safety critical code "good enough" is a very different level than on a throwaway-script? > That's why I think subjective determination of good enough falls short in some scenarios. I've repeatedly said that subjective risk assessment is usually not enough: >> Standards and outside analysis are important, even in non-safety critical systems, but they are no substitute for a developer making careful assements of if code is good enough. >I'm not sure if you've been so focused on being right that you've ignored that central point, or if I'm just not communicating it effectively I think your communication issues or on the listening side as you keep projecting a strawman onto people rather than actually listening to what people are saying. But since we both appear to feel that the other one is not listening, that is probably a clue this conversation should end. I do encourage you to take some time carefully re-reading the thread to see if you can figure out why you seem to misinterpret so much of what people say.
- bumby 5y ago
  What an odd and condescending take, even when try explaining to me the failure modes of a system I actually have firsthand experience with. Doesn't that seem like something that should give you pause to self-reflect? I understand your point. What you seem to be missing is that we're talking about two different things. I agree that decisions should be made in the context of the risk of the engineering application. That's trivially apparent to the point where it's almost confusing that you would feel the need to bring up up (ad nauseum). It's also not particularly interesting because just about everybody will agree with that. What I'm talking about is when people fall prey to cognitive biases to the point where they can no longer make accurate risk assessments. That's a much more interesting problem because the engineering world is full of cases where otherwise smart engineers make terrible judgement calls, all the while telling themselves that they understand the risk. I literally brought up cognitive biases in my first post and instead of responding to what I'm actually discussing, you just keep underscoring a trivially simple point. I think you're reading your own interpretation into what I'm trying to say and then somehow twisting it into being a miscommunication on my part. When I'm saying subjective judgement can lead to bad decisions, I am not saying "we take all the unique and contextual facts into consideration and arrive at a reasonable subjective risk assessment for this scenario". I'm saying people's cognitive biases can lead to them discounting risk without good evidence because it results in a decision they are emotionally attached to. E.g., "I don't want to miss schedule and look bad, so let's rationalize away this risk that really wasn't mitigated." That is not an objective risk-based decision, it's a biased emotional one. They may think it's "good enough" to get the job done, until it's not (as in the cases I specifically brought up). While I already explained it but it didn't seem to sink in, I'll reiterate one last time: You seem to say your definition of "good enough" is based on good, risk-based judgement. I already said if that's the case then we don't disagree. But I also said that is not the context that the term "good enough" is generally used in practice. In my experience, it's used to justify a sub-standard effort and I've given you concrete examples of that. That point of digression between what I'm saying and what you're interpreting seemed to fly right by you because you're more concerned with arguing, and there's some irony in you pointing out that someone else isn't listening.