4 ms·

Those classes are illustrative, not exhaustive

jcranmer 5y ago
I don't see a single word in the operative part that suggests that the list is an inclusive list: > (b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. In interpreting statute, a list of things is generally assumed to be exclusive unless there are specific words that indicate it is to be treated as nonexclusive--and those words are missing here.
- henryfjordan 5y ago
  > The California Supreme Court has repeatedly "interpreted the [law] as protecting classes other than those listed on its face".[6] For example, even prior to the 2005 addition of sexual orientation to the law's list of covered classes, the Unruh Act had been "construed as protecting gays and lesbians from arbitrary discrimination",[6] such as in the case of Rolon v. Kulwitzky.[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unruh_Civil_Rights_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unruh_Civil_Rights_Act
junon 5y ago
Which part of the legal text indicates that?
- eesmith 5y ago
  Quoting the CA Supreme Court unanimous decision, In re COX, 1970 at https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/3/205.html https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/3/2... > [3] The nature of the 1959 amendments, the past judicial interpretation of the act, and the history of legislative action that extended the statutes' scope, indicate that identification of particular bases of discrimination--color, race, religion, ancestry, and national origin--added by the 1959 amendment, is illustrative rather than restrictive. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, p. 4424, § 1.) Although the legislation has been invoked primarily by persons alleging discrimination on racial grounds, its language and its history compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination by business establishments. Finally, in 1961 the Legislature substituted "all persons" for "all citizens" (Stats. 1961, ch. 1187, p. 2920, § 1) in order to broaden further the section and complete the consistent pattern of wide applicability of the section. [4]

I don't see a single word in the operative part that suggests that the list is an inclusive list: > (b) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. In interpreting statute, a list of things is generally assumed to be exclusive unless there are specific words that indicate it is to be treated as nonexclusive--and those words are missing here.

henryfjordan 5y ago
> The California Supreme Court has repeatedly "interpreted the [law] as protecting classes other than those listed on its face".[6] For example, even prior to the 2005 addition of sexual orientation to the law's list of covered classes, the Unruh Act had been "construed as protecting gays and lesbians from arbitrary discrimination",[6] such as in the case of Rolon v. Kulwitzky.[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unruh_Civil_Rights_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unruh_Civil_Rights_Act

junon 5y ago

Which part of the legal text indicates that?

eesmith 5y ago
Quoting the CA Supreme Court unanimous decision, In re COX, 1970 at https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/3/205.html https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/3/2... > [3] The nature of the 1959 amendments, the past judicial interpretation of the act, and the history of legislative action that extended the statutes' scope, indicate that identification of particular bases of discrimination--color, race, religion, ancestry, and national origin--added by the 1959 amendment, is illustrative rather than restrictive. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1866, p. 4424, § 1.) Although the legislation has been invoked primarily by persons alleging discrimination on racial grounds, its language and its history compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination by business establishments. Finally, in 1961 the Legislature substituted "all persons" for "all citizens" (Stats. 1961, ch. 1187, p. 2920, § 1) in order to broaden further the section and complete the consistent pattern of wide applicability of the section. [4]