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We might be on opposite sides of the Chalmers/Dennett divide, but we don't know how consciousness (as opposed to human-level intelligence) arises. Here's my r

We might be on opposite sides of the Chalmers/Dennett divide, but we don't know how consciousness (as opposed to human-level intelligence) arises. Here's my reasoning for why the Chinese Room isn't (phenomenally) conscious: http://fmjlang.co.uk/blog/ChineseRoom.html http://fmjlang.co.uk/blog/ChineseRoom.html

AnIdiotOnTheNet 5y ago
You make, in my opinion, the same mistake as Searle does, which is to take for granted that humans are 'more' than a system of interacting components in a way that no other system can be. The system of the room may well experience and understand color (or consciousness) the same way the system of your human body and brain do, we have no way of saying otherwise. Like Searle, your argument relies on the intuition that humans are a specially privileged arrangement of molecules in the universe.
- DonaldFisk 5y ago
  Understanding is different from experiencing. This is where I side with Chalmers and not Dennett. I accept that the system would have some understanding of colours (as would the person in the room - notably, Knut Nordby had a far better understanding of colour vision than most people despite only seeing in monochrome). But I am skeptical that the system experiences colours. Someone with normal colour vision is able to experience colours because they have cones on their retina which is somehow linked to their consciousness (probably by means of neurons further into their brains). Achromatopes, including the person inside the room, don't. They experience only different shades of grey. But they are able to tell what the colours are, by means of a set of three differently coloured filters. Do you mean that the filters experience colours as qualia but are unable to pass on this experience to the achromatope, or do you mean that the system must experience qualia simply because it behaves (to an outside observer) as if it sees in colour? I suppose it boils down to this: is the experience of colour additional information to the knowledge of colour?
  - int_19h 5y ago
    The experience of color is ultimately a bunch of neurons firing in a certain way. The neurons themselves don't experience anything - the entire assembly does, as a whole. From that perspective, it's not clear why the Chinese room can't experience colors, even if individual people-"neurons" only transmit the underlying signals like RGB measurements.
  - AnIdiotOnTheNet 5y ago
    The cones in your eye are essentially the same as the color filters, they respond to certain wavelengths and not others. It is the neurons in our brains that interpret what those signals mean, as the person in the room does. It is doubtful that any single neuron has an experience of color as we would, and neither would the cone, but in aggregate the system does. There is no component that you can point to and say "that's the part that experiences the color", the same way as you can't for the room. It is only our intuition that 'inanimate objects' aren't conscious (and that people are!) that makes your's and Searle's arguments appear reasonable.
    - DonaldFisk 5y ago
      This is just the system argument, which I accept works well for understanding, but I'm unconvinced it works for qualia. Here's another thought experiment: Replace the coloured filters with a system consisting of a camera connected to a computer which prints out the colour, which is then read by the achromatope. Here I assume you'd argue that the camera + computer doesn't experience colours, but the system (camera + computer + achromatope) does. Now, replace the camera + computer by a person who can actually see colours, who tells the achromatope which colours they see. In that case, the person who can see colours experiences the colours, and there's no need to invoke the system argument.
      - AnIdiotOnTheNet 5y ago
        This is a compelling argument, but it does make the assumption that the experiential system need necessarily wholly contain the experience of the component parts, rather than merely overlap with it. Yes, the color-sighted person can experience colors on their own, but their ability to see color is what is part of the experiential system the same way the computer's ability to see color was.

AnIdiotOnTheNet 5y ago

You make, in my opinion, the same mistake as Searle does, which is to take for granted that humans are 'more' than a system of interacting components in a way that no other system can be. The system of the room may well experience and understand color (or consciousness) the same way the system of your human body and brain do, we have no way of saying otherwise. Like Searle, your argument relies on the intuition that humans are a specially privileged arrangement of molecules in the universe.

DonaldFisk 5y ago
Understanding is different from experiencing. This is where I side with Chalmers and not Dennett. I accept that the system would have some understanding of colours (as would the person in the room - notably, Knut Nordby had a far better understanding of colour vision than most people despite only seeing in monochrome). But I am skeptical that the system experiences colours. Someone with normal colour vision is able to experience colours because they have cones on their retina which is somehow linked to their consciousness (probably by means of neurons further into their brains). Achromatopes, including the person inside the room, don't. They experience only different shades of grey. But they are able to tell what the colours are, by means of a set of three differently coloured filters. Do you mean that the filters experience colours as qualia but are unable to pass on this experience to the achromatope, or do you mean that the system must experience qualia simply because it behaves (to an outside observer) as if it sees in colour? I suppose it boils down to this: is the experience of colour additional information to the knowledge of colour?
- int_19h 5y ago
  The experience of color is ultimately a bunch of neurons firing in a certain way. The neurons themselves don't experience anything - the entire assembly does, as a whole. From that perspective, it's not clear why the Chinese room can't experience colors, even if individual people-"neurons" only transmit the underlying signals like RGB measurements.
- AnIdiotOnTheNet 5y ago
  The cones in your eye are essentially the same as the color filters, they respond to certain wavelengths and not others. It is the neurons in our brains that interpret what those signals mean, as the person in the room does. It is doubtful that any single neuron has an experience of color as we would, and neither would the cone, but in aggregate the system does. There is no component that you can point to and say "that's the part that experiences the color", the same way as you can't for the room. It is only our intuition that 'inanimate objects' aren't conscious (and that people are!) that makes your's and Searle's arguments appear reasonable.
  - DonaldFisk 5y ago
    This is just the system argument, which I accept works well for understanding, but I'm unconvinced it works for qualia. Here's another thought experiment: Replace the coloured filters with a system consisting of a camera connected to a computer which prints out the colour, which is then read by the achromatope. Here I assume you'd argue that the camera + computer doesn't experience colours, but the system (camera + computer + achromatope) does. Now, replace the camera + computer by a person who can actually see colours, who tells the achromatope which colours they see. In that case, the person who can see colours experiences the colours, and there's no need to invoke the system argument.
    - AnIdiotOnTheNet 5y ago
      This is a compelling argument, but it does make the assumption that the experiential system need necessarily wholly contain the experience of the component parts, rather than merely overlap with it. Yes, the color-sighted person can experience colors on their own, but their ability to see color is what is part of the experiential system the same way the computer's ability to see color was.