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I'd believe that you're describing your system's current requirements at a high level. But without exact technical details of how retaining personal information
by mindslight 5y ago
I'd believe that you're describing your system's current requirements at a high level. But without exact technical details of how retaining personal information helps you prevent fraud many years later, I don't believe that it is the only way possible.
For example, if the personal information you're talking about is IP addresses, it seems like you could cook those down to non-identifying information pretty quickly - eg zap the last octet. Furthermore, I'd think you would want to cook it down promptly so you can store the current use of the IP block rather than what it might be used for in a few years. (Sidenote: I personally get hassled based on my IP address block way too much, so keep in mind you're harming legitimate customers if this is what you're doing).
Another example - if you're keeping personal details on people who have committed fraud (or not) and referencing that years later, then I'd say that falls squarely in the purpose of the GDPR and you should not be doing that long term.
Or you're doing something else. But without describing exactly what you're doing, you don't make a very compelling case.
- Silhouette 5y agoAnother example - if you're keeping personal details on people who have committed fraud (or not) and referencing that years later, then I'd say that falls squarely in the purpose of the GDPR and you should not be doing that long term. You're saying that we shouldn't be keeping detailed records of previous attempts to criminally defraud us that are demonstrably useful for identifying and preventing further attempts to criminally defraud us over a long period of time by the same groups of people? I'm sorry to be blunt but that is not a serious proposition. If anyone thinks the GDPR says otherwise, chapter and verse please.
- mindslight 5y agoIs that what you are specifically doing and describing above, or are you just choosing one implication of my general pondering? If this is actually what you're doing, let's discuss the specific details of the information flow you're using to make these decisions, rather than talking in terms of strong sweeping generalizations. If you're just picking out a worst case implication of my general statement, that doesn't seem very productive. An example of what I was specifically thinking: Customer buys something from Vendor. Customer never receives package. Vendor refuses to issue refund because tracking marks delivered. Customer files CC chargeback (I know this is less common in the EU but work with me here). From the perspective of the Vendor this Customer has defrauded them, or at the very least is an increased risk. From the perspective of the Customer, they've been unjustly judged for circumstances beyond their control. Can the Vendor retain that judgement on the Customer forever? Can they share it with other Vendors to create an industry blacklist of "problematic" customers? These questions seem squarely within the aim of the GDPR.
- Silhouette 5y agoIn the example I was thinking of the situation was much more clear-cut than that. Again I'm not going to get into real specifics because this is legal stuff and it's just a discussion forum, but consider this broadly similar example. You provide a service that anyone can sign up for. It costs money. As a matter of good customer service your usual practice is to allow significant grace periods when money owed is overdue before you actually cut a customer off. Someone signs up for a real account using the name "Mallory One" and then exploits the "generosity" of your system to avoid paying part of what they owe you. Eventually you cut them off. Someone then signs up for a real account using the name "Mallory Two" and does the same thing again. Again you eventually cut them off but miss part of the payment you were due. After this has happened several times over an extended period, it comes to your attention that the only people signing up using names of the form "Mallory (number)" are ripping you off and the person or persons responsible have already cost you thousands in unpaid bills. You add a rule to your security system that says when anyone creates an account with the name "Mallory (number)" you will immediately block it. How long are you allowed to remember the pattern "Mallory (name)" in your security system if it can potentially be tied to a specific individual and is therefore personal data but you reasonably believe that person to be responsible for all of that fraud and you reasonably expect that they will continue to defraud you if you don't prevent it?
- mindslight 5y agoIs this is a practical way of preventing fraud? Can the person not switch their next account from "Mallory Three" to "Eve Smith", thereby evading your rule? I understand you've simplified the example here for the sake of discussion, but I think the details inform the situation. Like if you really just want to discriminate on any account named "Mallory _____" then that doesn't seem like personal data to me (even though you've created the rule from "personal data"), but also it doesn't seem particularly effective so there must be more to the story. For an analogous example, you don't need to keep a permanent record of fraudulent transactions with specific IP addresses of 10.0.37.{23,45,67} to remember that 10.0.37/24 is suspicious. (Also what about everybody else who legitimately has the first name Mallory ?) Your case is interesting because it contains a few unusual qualities that businesses generally don't offer, but smaller "nicer" businesses will give more leeway. You could straightforwardly stop giving a large freebie to new users or require a payment method or identification on signup, but it would be nice to figure out where the line is instead of just giving in to such less friendly practices.
- tremon 5y agoI agree with you that this is a good example of a GDPR challenge. I think that building a profile of user patterns to protect against fraud & abuse is a perfectly legitimate business interest, even under the GDPR. But I disagree that this is a problem unique to the GDPR -- any means of profiling like this runs the risk of discriminating against protected groups or individuals, and there's been plenty of discussion here about e.g. the use of proxy identifiers for race of background employed by universities to filter applicants. As with all legislation, there is no clear yes or no answer. If a GDPR watchdog were to evaluate your use of this information, they would primarily care whether you (as a company) are aware of the risks involved in the profiling, whether you have spent the effort to weigh the pros and cons of your approach, and whether you have taken steps to sufficiently anonymize such data without making it useless for your purpose. If you have, I don't think you have to worry about retroactive fines even if the watchdog concludes you're violating the GDPR in some way. Personally, I'd go even further and say that you don't have to honour data deletion requests from users that have tried to defraud you -- it's unlikely they will do so because they would be required to identify themselves to you, after which you can turn them in to the police, but you can legitimately argue that you need to keep their identity on-file to protect your business. I'm sure the GDPR disagrees with me here, but I'd like to see a watchdog test that case in court.
- Silhouette 5y agoI'm sure the GDPR disagrees with me here, but I'd like to see a watchdog test that case in court. I doubt it. The right to erasure has never been absolute even under GDPR. Typical examples are that you can't compel a bank to delete all records of a loan it gave you, nor compel the police to delete a criminal record of your past behaviour, as long as the data is lawfully and properly handled.