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Right. We need to run anti-virus programs in jails with read-only file system access. That should be a standard OS feature. They should output a list of files t
by Animats 5y ago
Right. We need to run anti-virus programs in jails with read-only file system access. That should be a standard OS feature. They should output a list of files to be examined or deleted or jailed, but not actually do anything about them. That should be the job of a separate, very dumb, open source program.
- metadat 5y agoThat would be nice, but would they still need to deflect or at least detect infections-in-progress? This seems impossible to achieve if you are locked up in jail.
- Animats 5y agoExamining incoming stuff also needs to be split between the examiner, with the power only to report, and the trusted input and output parts, which should be dumb. The whole concept of anti-virus software being trusted is just wrong, both in theory and practice.
- jesprenj 5y ago> We need to run ... That should be a standard OS feature You don't mean this should be included in _every_ operating system, right? I'd say the overhead would be too high for that little protection benefit, at least for a portion of computers.
- Animats 5y agoIt's not a big overhead item. You should be able to configure Linux for that, via SELinux. Read anything,communicate with nothing, write only to one file.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoOn modern systems, "read anything" can sometimes turn into "communicate with someone who's listening".
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- gruez 5y ago>Right. We need to run anti-virus programs in jails with read-only file system access Modern antiviruses do more than just scanning files. They also have system hooks as well, for behavioral analysis and real time scanning. It's unclear how that would be implemented with the scheme you just described, without a massive API being added to the kernel.
- ReactiveJelly 5y agoI'd rather see 'phoenix' style systems catch on, even for desktops. Don't try to repair a system with 1,000,000 random files in it. Just have a plan to automatically rebuild it from a list of pinned packages and a folder of your personal data. Scanning the system from within the system feels bound to fail, when a lot of my stuff has to run as root. Even if I'm not root, there is this: https://xkcd.com/1200/ https://xkcd.com/1200/ But if you want jails and read-only FS, you can try to construct it from something like Docker. With LVM you can make point-in-time FS snapshots and scan those. Docker probably has known escapes, but if your scanner is FOSS you could layer it inside a wasm runtime too. Defense-in-depth doctrine says that something is better than nothing, but I feel like expecting a broken system to report that it's broken and fix itself is a bit doomed. Having a physically separate audit server behind a data diode is also an approach I've considered. That way malware is less able to hide logs once it's in. The trouble is, all these ideas require lots of new code that nobody has a reason to trust or maintain or use.