5 ms·

We live at the dawn of cyberterrorism, I'm glad we are stepping out of nuclear now.

by rizkeyz 5y ago

BlueTemplar 5y ago
Hopefully the few computers needed do not use generalist OSes and aren't connected to the Internet either ?
- selfhoster11 5y ago
  IIRC, some nuclear readout panels were accessible over the public internet using badly secured VNC, so I think that's not the case.
- goodpoint 5y ago
  I assume you never worked in security.
  - BlueTemplar 5y ago
    Should we be concerned then about nuclear weapons to be hacked too ?
    - goodpoint 5y ago
      Not to the point of detonating them - they have a lot of physical safeguards.
Zardoz84 5y ago
And why you need any electric central connected to internet ?
DocTomoe 5y ago
Here's a radical idea: Maybe your potentially dangerous industrial machinery does not need to be directly connected to the internet?
selfhoster11 5y ago
It's not impossible to purpose-build hardened, incompatible, read only systems that can submit telemetry to the outside world while only providing actual control on-site (or via restricted channels). Stuxnet wouldn't have happened (or would have been a very rare event) if they built their system this way.
- RealityVoid 5y ago
  Stuxnet happened despite being air gaped. Regardless, I am confident you can place physical safeguards that could not lead to nuclear emissions even in the event of loss of control over the computer systems.
  - selfhoster11 5y ago
    It happened despite being air-gapped, because they used general purpose hardware and software. If their systems were built on purposely incompatible hardware and software (as I proposed) and could mainly communicate using a serial console, the attack surface would be much, much lower, and the attacks would be much, much harder.
    - RealityVoid 5y ago
      Having worked on for a short stint with some power plant control systems, I can say that, at least the systems I worked with, were quite niche. The actual control was happening on these racks that ran a VxWorks OS on some Motorola, I think they were, MCU's. Despite this, the systems were interfaced with some Windows machines that did supervision. When they were operating, they had redundancies, and were quite locked down. Of course, at that time, I was a noob and did not understand _everything_ that was going on in there. Actually, now that I think of it, the WDPF system it was derivated off was used in some nuclear power plants as well. Regardless, what I wanted to say was... being obscure, while it makes things mildly harder for skiddies is not a big deal for state actors or more resourceful attackers. The Stuxnet was highly targeted and they got access to specific vulnerabilities in the Siemens DCS systems that were running there. Just having exotic systems is no guarantee. I agree, obscurity is a layer of defense in depth, but no guarantee. Surely you don't suggest they use a new purpose built HW for each control system design. Also, control systems DO need to have their SW updated as well. It's obvious you can't make it hard read only. You do have physical lockout mechanisms for this though.
goodpoint 5y ago
Not only cyber. A nuclear power plant makes an excellent target for terrorism or war. Even if the attack is completely unsuccessful it would cause panic. Furthermore, highly centralized electricity generation makes the distribution network very vulnerable as well.

We live at the dawn of cyberterrorism, I'm glad we are stepping out of nuclear now.

BlueTemplar 5y ago

Hopefully the few computers needed do not use generalist OSes and aren't connected to the Internet either ?

selfhoster11 5y ago
IIRC, some nuclear readout panels were accessible over the public internet using badly secured VNC, so I think that's not the case.
goodpoint 5y ago
I assume you never worked in security.
- BlueTemplar 5y ago
  Should we be concerned then about nuclear weapons to be hacked too ?
  - goodpoint 5y ago
    Not to the point of detonating them - they have a lot of physical safeguards.

Zardoz84 5y ago

And why you need any electric central connected to internet ?

DocTomoe 5y ago

Here's a radical idea: Maybe your potentially dangerous industrial machinery does not need to be directly connected to the internet?

selfhoster11 5y ago

It's not impossible to purpose-build hardened, incompatible, read only systems that can submit telemetry to the outside world while only providing actual control on-site (or via restricted channels). Stuxnet wouldn't have happened (or would have been a very rare event) if they built their system this way.

RealityVoid 5y ago
Stuxnet happened despite being air gaped. Regardless, I am confident you can place physical safeguards that could not lead to nuclear emissions even in the event of loss of control over the computer systems.
- selfhoster11 5y ago
  It happened despite being air-gapped, because they used general purpose hardware and software. If their systems were built on purposely incompatible hardware and software (as I proposed) and could mainly communicate using a serial console, the attack surface would be much, much lower, and the attacks would be much, much harder.
  - RealityVoid 5y ago
    Having worked on for a short stint with some power plant control systems, I can say that, at least the systems I worked with, were quite niche. The actual control was happening on these racks that ran a VxWorks OS on some Motorola, I think they were, MCU's. Despite this, the systems were interfaced with some Windows machines that did supervision. When they were operating, they had redundancies, and were quite locked down. Of course, at that time, I was a noob and did not understand _everything_ that was going on in there. Actually, now that I think of it, the WDPF system it was derivated off was used in some nuclear power plants as well. Regardless, what I wanted to say was... being obscure, while it makes things mildly harder for skiddies is not a big deal for state actors or more resourceful attackers. The Stuxnet was highly targeted and they got access to specific vulnerabilities in the Siemens DCS systems that were running there. Just having exotic systems is no guarantee. I agree, obscurity is a layer of defense in depth, but no guarantee. Surely you don't suggest they use a new purpose built HW for each control system design. Also, control systems DO need to have their SW updated as well. It's obvious you can't make it hard read only. You do have physical lockout mechanisms for this though.

goodpoint 5y ago

Not only cyber. A nuclear power plant makes an excellent target for terrorism or war. Even if the attack is completely unsuccessful it would cause panic. Furthermore, highly centralized electricity generation makes the distribution network very vulnerable as well.