4 ms·
The precedent doesn't apply. The SCOTUS interpreted (and in effect, defined) that the "authorized access" in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) can't be qualified and limit
by rsstack 5y ago
The precedent doesn't apply. The SCOTUS interpreted (and in effect, defined) that the "authorized access" in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) can't be qualified and limited to less access. If I'm authorized to see usernames, and due to light hacking I can also see emails - I'm n̵o̵t̵ ̵a̵ ̵c̵r̵i̵m̵i̵n̵a̵l̵ maybe a criminal (EDITED). If I'm authorized to check license plates for some reasons, and despite employer policy I checked license plates for some other reasons - I'm not a criminal.
The issue we're discussing here is based on 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (note the last digit) and "authorized access" is not mentioned there at all. This section deals with damage and not access.
- awinter-py 5y agohmm, not really my area. This coverage of van buren seems to show the court trying to make 'authorization' agree in meaning in different parts of (a)(2)? https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-ends-long-running-circuit-split-over-cfaa-exceeds-authorized-access https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-ends-long...
- rsstack 5y agoThis incident has nothing to do with (a)(2) as Marak didn't _access_ any system. The only sections violated are (a)(5) (_knowingly damaging_ a system) and, arguably, (a)(7) (extortion). (a)(7) is a lot harder to argue though as his extortion attempt doesn't have a named target or an explicit demand and is generally... lame. Edit: Note that I'm seeing this the same as a virus, not the same as a data-extraction hack.