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Your argument is pretty much that you can't/shouldn't trust WhatsApp/Signal and Moxie's argument is you don't need to if the cryptography is implemented correct

by jpgvm 5y ago

Your argument is pretty much that you can't/shouldn't trust WhatsApp/Signal and Moxie's argument is you don't need to if the cryptography is implemented correctly. It can't be just switched off, any update to the applications gets reversed within hours of release well before it's rolled out to a significant population of the users because exploits in both are quite prized. As someone else pointed out WhatsApp RCEs go for ~$1.5M USD, that is in a similar class to iMessage. Signals relay system is effectively untrusted at the protocol layer, this isn't much different from Bitcoin. The only real difference is the only people running it are the Signal folk. Is it an improvement to have a decentralized backend? Only arguably. From a user perspective it's actually often worse as fully decentralized peer-to-peer systems often perform worse and can't implement optimisations that are possible in centralised systems. From a purely "I can't trust anyone" perspective then no, but even Bitcoin and friends aren't that either. You trust the Bitcoin developers to not alter the protocol in a subtle way to weaken it just like you trust the Signal developers and server infrastructure not to subley subvert the cryptosystem. What I am saying is I think trusting the protocol developers of blockchain like systems isn't substantially different from trusting the Signal developers with the exception that it would be easier to fork a blockchain if you disagreed while spinning up your own Signal infrastructure would be quite a lot more work. As for powerful wall connected devices I do think you are being a bit facetious here. The vast majority of the population the mobile phone is their primary computing device. This is true across most of Asia, India and Africa. More modern developed countries have a wider proliferation of powerful consumer computing hardware but even there non-mobile computing is dwindling and while devices like iPad/tablets are becoming more popular they are prone to the same shortcomings of mobile devices (locked down OS, little/no background processing capability, unreliably connectivity). Also I wouldn't cling too quickly to the idea that Apple is selling you something drastically different from Google. If you look at their recent earnings reports they are now generating more and more of their profits as a precentage from their services business. They very much are attempting to follow the Google model, they just weren't as aggressive in the route they took. I don't actually see that as a problem though. If they can pursue a very cloud heavy model that is privacy preserving and protected by sufficient cryptography I don't see a problem. If however they keep going down the path of the device local CSAM scanning and the like... well I guess I won't be buying more Apple products. At the end of the day user experience is king. Everything else fades away under the weight of sheer amounts of money that comes from bowing to consumerism. If all this Web 3.0 stuff has a poor user experience vs what is being peddled by Google/Apple then don't expect it survive for that long.

mike_hearn 5y ago
I don't think it's safe to assume exploit vendors are concerned about end-user privacy. The point about decentralization is that merely noticing problems isn't good enough. Information propagation is hard! What are you going to do if a WhatsApp contact sends you a message saying the encryption was disabled? Forward the message, presumably ... ah. Audited builds aren't hugely useful unless there is teeth behind the audits, like the ability to block a change to the software that violates the social contract implemented by the encryption. If you don't have that then so what? With that level of control they are basically just saying "we aren't peeking right now, promise!" The reason it takes years to roll out end to end encryption in other protocols is not that centralization is inherently better or faster. It's that it takes a long time to build up a consensus around a new way of doing things and get people to take it seriously. That process isn't really optional though, if you skip it you get the WhatsApp problem where stuff is encrypted up until the moment a single executive decides it shouldn't be. If you can switch it on and off with the flick of a mouse then it's not actually making our society more robust against damaging behaviours by the adversaries, which is the ultimate point of implementing encryption in the first place.

by jpgvm 5y ago

mike_hearn 5y ago

I don't think it's safe to assume exploit vendors are concerned about end-user privacy. The point about decentralization is that merely noticing problems isn't good enough. Information propagation is hard! What are you going to do if a WhatsApp contact sends you a message saying the encryption was disabled? Forward the message, presumably ... ah. Audited builds aren't hugely useful unless there is teeth behind the audits, like the ability to block a change to the software that violates the social contract implemented by the encryption. If you don't have that then so what? With that level of control they are basically just saying "we aren't peeking right now, promise!" The reason it takes years to roll out end to end encryption in other protocols is not that centralization is inherently better or faster. It's that it takes a long time to build up a consensus around a new way of doing things and get people to take it seriously. That process isn't really optional though, if you skip it you get the WhatsApp problem where stuff is encrypted up until the moment a single executive decides it shouldn't be. If you can switch it on and off with the flick of a mouse then it's not actually making our society more robust against damaging behaviours by the adversaries, which is the ultimate point of implementing encryption in the first place.