https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/library/blog/873 https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/library/blog/873 > Perhaps the most adverse unintended consequence of NCLB is that

https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/library/blog/873 https://edpolicy.stanford.edu/library/blog/873 > Perhaps the most adverse unintended consequence of NCLB is that it creates incentives for schools to rid themselves of students who are not doing well, producing higher scores at the expense of vulnerable students' education. Studies have found that sanctioning schools based on average student scores leads schools to retain students in grade so that grade-level scores will look better (although these students ultimately do less well and drop out at higher rates), exclude low-scoring students from admissions and encourage such students to transfer or drop out. https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/10/27/443110755/no-child-left-behind-what-worked-what-didnt https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/10/27/443110755/no-chil... > Ahn found a very different story among schools where lots of students were struggling. For these, often poorer schools, the law was like quicksand. Donna Brown is director of federal program monitoring and support for North Carolina's public schools, and she saw the quicksand firsthand. > "When I came to the department in 2004," Brown remembers, "there were nine schools in the state that were identified for some level of improvement sanction. And, by 2008-9, there were 521."