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So I know this is all probabilistic and there's probably some benefit, but are there really a meaningful number of attackers who could attack a server which onl
by yjftsjthsd-h 5y ago
So I know this is all probabilistic and there's probably some benefit, but are there really a meaningful number of attackers who could attack a server which only allows public key authentication and who will be slowed by country-granularity IP blocking? If you're counting blocked attempts in logs, you're counting attempts that were never going to succeed.
(Note: This works only if 1. Your IP blocks are very coarse, and 2. You disallow password authentication)
- jffry 5y agoThis isn't about deflecting a targeted attack, it's about reducing the amount of noise in your logs so that it becomes easier to detect a targeted attack. For the same reason, assuming you must expose SSHD to the world, it makes sense not to expose it on port 22. If you set up a machine on AWS EC2 and give it a public IP address, you can watch in near-realtime as the "admin/admin" login attempts come in (last time I tried this on a whim it took less than a minute).
- fivea 5y ago> If you're counting blocked attempts in logs, you're counting attempts that were never going to succeed. By your own logic, if the problematic traffic shares the same geographic origin and you only happen to spot failed attempts, blocking all traffic from the same geographic origin would also block potentially successful attempts. And I agree with the OP: there's an awful lot of malicious traffic sharing a common geographical origin. If you ever felt curious, just launch a cheap VM and setup a web server to listen to traffic and log any connection attempt. You don't even need to host a site. In no time you'll start to see your VM being hit by all sorts of web scrapers and security vulnerability scanners.