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This makes a tacit assumption that the dead continue to somehow exist, that some "they" remain, and "for them" something may be one way or another. Assuming th
by nine_k 5y ago
This makes a tacit assumption that the dead continue to somehow exist, that some "they" remain, and "for them" something may be one way or another.
Assuming the absence of afterlife, when I die, I literally am no more. No more anyone to experience anything, including time. No one to experience a relief from pain which the death has ended, for example. No one to even not care about the world any more.
This is very simple, if not subjectively intuitive: nobody has experience of not existing, because such experience is a contradiction in terms. But referring to whatever related to a dead person's alleged experience after death is a use-after-free error.
(Dying, on the other hand, is a very real experience, but likely it's very hard to communicate, for a number of obvious reasons.)
- chalcolithic 5y ago>nobody has experience of not existing Don't we all have experience of not existing for 13.7 billion years? It'll be the same once we die.
- bagacrap 5y agoI think what it means is an arrangement of mass (particles, spins, charges, ...) exactly identical to your own must eventually reassemble, e.g a Boltzmann brain or a simulation or an actual human identical to you, by chance. It has nothing to do with some everlasting ethereal "soul".
- jlokier 5y agoIf you reject that tacit assumption, you may wish to examine the closely related tacit assumption that living persons that experience do exist. The relation between the two assumptions is informative. The thing called you is, in one model, just a collection of atoms, a particular solution to some equations, after all. Some complicated world-lines, that anyone with a sufficiently powerful computer and the right collection of seemingly random numbers could reproduce in principle - or is it? Maybe the dead don't experience anything. But until you can say what distinguishes "experience" (and "reality") for the living from the mere existence of solutions to equations, it's a missing-definition error to conclude anything sweeping and universal about experience. You can certainly define experience in various ways, for example particular kinds of electrochemical activity in the brain, or organised information processing in matter of a certain kind. If you do that, you can conclude that those processes cease. But those are limited definitions for convenience. We cannot say with certainty that's what actual living experience is "made of", so we cannot say with certainty the universal statement that all forms of actual experience cease. (We can, however, turn "certainty" in the above into a kind of variable, in order to understand what we mean more subtly.) The distinction is sometimes called "fire in the equations". Who knows what makes a living person actually experience - assuming you believe living persons do.
- whimsicalism 5y agoI don't think this is a particularly strong assumption, it is the same assumption you make about basic continuity of life/you being the same person you were 5 minutes ago.