That's an interesting point. I would make the refutation that a system where large 'voters' in a DAO are forced to lock up their tokens after votes proportional

That's an interesting point. I would make the refutation that a system where large 'voters' in a DAO are forced to lock up their tokens after votes proportional to their power would prevent them from sabotaging the project, but if they had even more money at stake in a competitor its easy to imagine scenarios where such foul play may happen. The interesting thing about governance is that it existed before the term: In Bitcoin the community governs the direction of the protocol by directing their hash power, perceived value, and simple use of the network towards their desired fork. You can't do this with contract tokens unless you want to fork the entire Ethereum Blockchain for the sake of one DAO. Despite this limitation, if DAO pay to vote schemes could be combined with 'vote with your feet' you could have the clean, efficient governance of a DAO with the fully actionable emergency escape (a fork) in case foul play is sniffed out.