4 ms·

The most troubling quote in my reading is >Second, the application of the scientific method matters: what works >for ants and other nonhuman species is not al

by ipaul 5y ago

The most troubling quote in my reading is >Second, the application of the scientific method matters: what works >for ants and other nonhuman species is not always relevant for health >and/or human outcomes. That's the flip-side of the religious person's belief that we can't study human beings as animals because we are special. So we can't look at human sexuality, for example, except in the context of special rules. When we give into this notion of exceptionalism, we will continue to be mystified when the human don't just obey the special rules.

nescioquid 5y ago
To clarify, you are quoting from Monica McLemore's article which the linked article is criticizing. In John McWhorter's recent book, "Woke Racism", McWhorter argues that people like McLemore are adherents of a new religion (he means this in a literal, sociological way) which he calls "The Elect". The Elect's word for "heresy" is "problematic". McLemore ends with a call to action "So how do we engage with the problematic work of scientists whose legacy is complicated? I would suggest three strategies..." and goes on to recommend 1) "Truth and reconciliation", which sounds like all gatekeepers need to be members of The Elect 2) "diversifying the scientific workforce", phenotype is important, I guess 3) "new methods", which really sound like a set of new rules The Elect wish to impose Sounds like an inquisition.
bobthechef 5y ago
What religion? Because as I'm sure you well know, there is no such thing as "religion" per se. I'd challenge you to point to someone who is an adherent of "religion", as opposed to some particular faith (which we all have, btw). I am not aware, for example, of any major religious tradition that does not accept human beings as animals. Indeed, I'd have to ask you: what is it to be an animal, in your view, that your straw man religious person would find objectionable? For Aristotle, an animal is just a living organism (and therefore something with a body) with the capacity for locomotion. What makes human beings especially different from all known animals is rationality (and according to an ontological, as opposed to phylogenetic classification, any rational animal, extraterrestrial or not, would qualify as "human"). Those animals lacking rationality (and free choice) have traditionally been called beasts. Perhaps your equivocation trades on the common use of "animal" to mean "beast", but then it is an entirely uninteresting criticism. So yes, there is something special about having a rational nature. > So we can't look at human sexuality, for example, except in the context of special rules. This is really vague. What rules? Is that code for morality? As rational animals with the freedom to choose our actions, we are absolutely subject to morality. Beasts that merely react to impulses and have no choice in the matter are not moral agents, but we are because we are rational. Thus a man who rapes a woman is behaving immorally to the degree that he understands what he is doing and to the degree that he has a choice (those with severe mental deficits or suffering from psychosis might be examples of those who cannot be faulted, morally speaking). And what makes certain sexual behaviors wrong? That they frustrates the nature of the human sexual act. These aren't rules, but rather principles governing the teleological order of the faculties involved, and sexuality is not special in this regard, though perhaps dangerous (interesting that you chose that particular example). It is also immoral to lie because speech is intrinsically ordered toward communicating truth (note the presumption we make about speech in this regard; lying would not work otherwise). It is immoral to stick a pencil in your eye because it frustrates the faculty of sight. It is immoral to do drugs because they frustrate the exercise of reason. Happiness is living in conformity with one's nature; misery is to act contrary to it. Human beings struggle with living well, and living badly can be easier than living well, especially once you've accumulated bad habits. It does not follow that departures from what we ought somehow disprove the existence of the ought.

by ipaul 5y ago

nescioquid 5y ago

To clarify, you are quoting from Monica McLemore's article which the linked article is criticizing. In John McWhorter's recent book, "Woke Racism", McWhorter argues that people like McLemore are adherents of a new religion (he means this in a literal, sociological way) which he calls "The Elect". The Elect's word for "heresy" is "problematic". McLemore ends with a call to action "So how do we engage with the problematic work of scientists whose legacy is complicated? I would suggest three strategies..." and goes on to recommend 1) "Truth and reconciliation", which sounds like all gatekeepers need to be members of The Elect 2) "diversifying the scientific workforce", phenotype is important, I guess 3) "new methods", which really sound like a set of new rules The Elect wish to impose Sounds like an inquisition.

bobthechef 5y ago

What religion? Because as I'm sure you well know, there is no such thing as "religion" per se. I'd challenge you to point to someone who is an adherent of "religion", as opposed to some particular faith (which we all have, btw). I am not aware, for example, of any major religious tradition that does not accept human beings as animals. Indeed, I'd have to ask you: what is it to be an animal, in your view, that your straw man religious person would find objectionable? For Aristotle, an animal is just a living organism (and therefore something with a body) with the capacity for locomotion. What makes human beings especially different from all known animals is rationality (and according to an ontological, as opposed to phylogenetic classification, any rational animal, extraterrestrial or not, would qualify as "human"). Those animals lacking rationality (and free choice) have traditionally been called beasts. Perhaps your equivocation trades on the common use of "animal" to mean "beast", but then it is an entirely uninteresting criticism. So yes, there is something special about having a rational nature. > So we can't look at human sexuality, for example, except in the context of special rules. This is really vague. What rules? Is that code for morality? As rational animals with the freedom to choose our actions, we are absolutely subject to morality. Beasts that merely react to impulses and have no choice in the matter are not moral agents, but we are because we are rational. Thus a man who rapes a woman is behaving immorally to the degree that he understands what he is doing and to the degree that he has a choice (those with severe mental deficits or suffering from psychosis might be examples of those who cannot be faulted, morally speaking). And what makes certain sexual behaviors wrong? That they frustrates the nature of the human sexual act. These aren't rules, but rather principles governing the teleological order of the faculties involved, and sexuality is not special in this regard, though perhaps dangerous (interesting that you chose that particular example). It is also immoral to lie because speech is intrinsically ordered toward communicating truth (note the presumption we make about speech in this regard; lying would not work otherwise). It is immoral to stick a pencil in your eye because it frustrates the faculty of sight. It is immoral to do drugs because they frustrate the exercise of reason. Happiness is living in conformity with one's nature; misery is to act contrary to it. Human beings struggle with living well, and living badly can be easier than living well, especially once you've accumulated bad habits. It does not follow that departures from what we ought somehow disprove the existence of the ought.