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> We in security like to throw around that "once the attacker has physical access it's game over", but that isn't true in practice, as evidenced by the success
by AnthonyMouse 5y ago
> We in security like to throw around that "once the attacker has physical access it's game over", but that isn't true in practice, as evidenced by the success of locked platforms like iPhones.
People find iPhone jailbreaks all the time. Apple patches them, but if you want a jailbroken iPhone, they exist.
Moreover, the vulnerabilities they keep finding were there before they find them, and the ones they'll find tomorrow are there right now, if you have the resources to look.
And this is distinct from the level of resources (generally considered impractical for anyone) for other forms of computer security, e.g. AES replaced 3DES in 2001 but still to my knowledge nobody -- not even the NSA or other state actors -- has ever even broken 3DES.
If you ask whether a large corporation could break into an iPhone today given physical access, the answer is going to be yes. And without decapsulating your CPU. The physical vulnerabilities often end up being related to USB and things like that.
Remember the whole farce where the FBI wanted to get into some iPhone and "couldn't" because Apple refused to help them? Then they just paid somebody to break into it.
> You can be secure against physical access, at least assuming your attacker can't decapsulate your CPU, rewire it with a FIB workstation, and recapsulate it
Or steal your phone and leave you with an identical looking one that transmits your authentication to the real one as soon as you try to unlock it.
And that's really the physical access problem. If you have a device with full disk encryption and have cleared the keys from memory, the attacker might not be able to get the contents even with physical access. But if they've had physical access and then return the device to you, can you still trust it? Nope.
- marcan_42 5y ago> People find iPhone jailbreaks all the time. Apple patches them, but if you want a jailbroken iPhone, they exist. Most of which are tethered, which means they do not persist through reboots. And even if they're untethered, you can recover the platform with a DFU restore. Those jailbreaks only exist due to flaws in Apple's software, which is completely outside the premise that physical access means game over. If Apple's software were bug free there would be no practical jailbreaks, and physical access has nothing to do with it. Some of those jailbreaks work through remote access, like the ones used by NSO and company. And again, this is why they have the signing feature when installing an OS - so you can't install an older version vulnerable to a jailbreak and then give the phone to someone. > The physical vulnerabilities often end up being related to USB and things like that. Those aren't physical, they're software - checkm8 was a bug in the boot ROM. And this is why iBoot on M1 Macs doesn't support USB host mode to boot from USB disks, because the attack surface there is massive and Apple decided to find another way to allow macOS boots from USB without exposing their more critical bootloader to that. Nobody jailbreaks iPhones via physical vulnerabilities, but if they tried, Apple have been much more proactive in this area than pretty much everyone else too. They have things like memory encryption and authentication for the SEP memory area, environmental monitors, hardware design that avoids exposing things to software that could have a security impact, etc. > Remember the whole farce where the FBI wanted to get into some iPhone and "couldn't" because Apple refused to help them? Then they just paid somebody to break into it. And every new iPhone and every bug fixed, this gets harder. The attack they used for that phone no longer applies to newer ones. It's not just a game of whack-a-mole either; Apple have been at the forefront of attack mitigations and iDevices are some of the most secure consumer devices in existence (the Xbox One might be close). Doesn't mean they get it perfect; I have an Apple security report open for a bypass for one of their mitigations. But they try harder than pretty much everyone else in the industry. > Or steal your phone and leave you with an identical looking one that transmits your authentication to the real one as soon as you try to unlock it. That might work to get your PIN, but if nothing else you'd immediately notice it doesn't work properly or all your data is gone. That sure beats a silent backdoor in your phone.