3 ms·
There is no way for someone who receives the signature to know you used deterministic k, so the system can't enforce it; I guess the assumption is that once in
by saurik 5y ago
There is no way for someone who receives the signature to know you used deterministic k, so the system can't enforce it; I guess the assumption is that once in a blue moon you find someone with a bespoke implementation of the signature algorithm that failed to implement deterministic signatures.
- ulrikrasmussen 5y agoThat makes sense. I'm just surprised that this many people have apparently rolled their own signature algorithms with this flaw that running a bot to check for it is affordable. It's one of the most well-known mistakes to make in EC signature algorithms, and anyone researching how to implement these signatures should stumble upon high-profile cases such as the Sony private key leak, which should scare them enough to not trust that they can implement a reliable PRNG that won't generate the same nonce twice (with non-negligible probability). But I guess these bots check for a whole catalogue of mistakes, and this is a fairly cheap check to add if you are checking every transaction anyway.
- jmull 5y agoI would guess someone is looking for an opportunity to compromise a shared implementation, and then hoover up the proceeds as the compromised implementation is used.