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Your expression is heavily confused. In short: to say something like "But it was his voice, I recognized it, of course I trusted it" is inexcusable and even mor
by mdp2021 5y ago
Your expression is heavily confused. In short: to say something like "But it was his voice, I recognized it, of course I trusted it" is inexcusable and even more inexcusable today, because there must be awareness of technology - for the extra possibilities (e.g. easier forgery) and for those expectations which are instead not granted (e.g. limits in authentication).
If there exists e.g. a bank which accepts printed credit tokens, and a technology comes to exist that allows for simplified forgery of those printouts, the bank must actively inform itself and act accordingly. The service provider must know "they are not in the century before Gutenberg, those centuries are past" (figuratively: the idea is about the press, not the movable type). If a service provider accepted instructions through postcards, they must know about the ease of forging signatures. If electronic postcards come to exist (they do: it's the E-Mail), all involved parts must know that postcards have no sender authentication, and act accordingly.
That someone seem to have access to John's telephone, it corroborates that such someone is John, it does not prove it. If someone seems to be John and also has access to John's telephone, that increases the chances that it is John. If only the access to John's telephone is there, it is far from granted that that is John. If an employee asks you for two documents, that is increased security; if the process becomes that "now an alternative document suffices", that is decreased security.
The employee is supposed first of all to be reliable, which means careful as opposed to lax. In the context of banking, the employee must be aware of lack of sender authentication in emails, of SIM swapping, and yes even of the possibility of "deepfakes" - the same way a hired shepherd should be aware of wolves, it's the job.
Its organization must enforce decent, commonsensical security - not "good sense" but really "common sense", because it would be unacceptable that the typical (unfortunately) faults one sees would not be evident as faults to a majority, when exposed. I have seen web-based services stipulated in their form through a preliminary contract which enables them (they could be limited according to the security the client wanted), and then modifiable in the user's control panel - you may request by contract a read only access - for reporting instead of operation -, and then once in front of the user interface one is two clicks away from granting the user full access. Everyone went facepalm when shown that, everyone but the "carefully" selected "soldiers" of the enterprise.
- hungryforcodes 5y agoOK!