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Some may have missed the news in October (2021) about the 35 million dollars swindle, between UAE and Hong Kong, involving the bank director in HK receiving a c
by mdp2021 5y ago
Some may have missed the news in October (2021) about the 35 million dollars swindle, between UAE and Hong Kong, involving the bank director in HK receiving a call where the voice "of the company director" requested a transfer...
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/10/14/huge-bank-fraud-uses-deep-fake-voice-tech-to-steal-millions/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/10/14/huge-...
https://www.unite.ai/deepfaked-voice-enabled-35-million-bank-heist-in-2020/ https://www.unite.ai/deepfaked-voice-enabled-35-million-bank...
Not only the voice (simulated through machine learning) was trusted: also (even) emails had been unverified.
- pulse7 5y agoSo it already started: a new generation of swindling using computer generated voice, video and other artifacts... It didn't take much time to misuse the newest tech...
- mdp2021 5y agoThe issue is with the workers believing to live in a past distant century and sitting on the idea that current possibilities are "science fiction" - often criminally calibrating the risk on the abilities of the "man in the street", instead of the interested actor: the swindler. As in "But who could and would ever do it?"¹; the answer clearly being: the one really interested in doing it. I have heard, literally: "Well, if I cannot trust one's email nor one's telephone number [than a scam is like fate]"... From a bank employee. This is dangerously placed ignorance, in subcultures where unduly laxity was accepted. (¹ Again, an actual reply given to security experts showing systemic faults to managers.)
- hungryforcodes 5y agoThis didn't exist 10 years ago as a github project for anyone to download. How is it from a century in the distant past? Also, email and phone numbers are LITERALLY standard methods of 2FA. So what are you expecting bank employees to use?
- kragen 5y ago2FA is an abbreviation for "two-factor authentication" means that to authenticate a client, you require two of the three factors: something secret that they know, something they physically possess, and something they are (biometrics). It's important that you require both of the two factors to authenticate, not either of them. Email and phone numbers are not even one of these three factors, so not only are they not "standard methods of 2FA", they aren't methods of 2FA at all. Someone who claims they are using 2FA, but actually authenticates with email and/or phone numbers, is committing fraud. Even if, for example, a phone number were something you physically possessed, authenticating with only the phone number, or with the phone number plus any number of additional physical possessions, wouldn't be 2FA, because you're still only using one factor: "something you have". Historically, voice-based biometrics were a valid form of biometrics, even without a trusted path: you could prompt someone to say something they hadn't said before so that an attacker couldn't play back a recording. That is no longer the case. As https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29712024 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29712024 pointed out, Tacotron made this a plausible threat already in 02018. What do I expect bank employees to use? Well, starting 34 years ago in 01987, classified voice communications used a STU-III, which authenticates both parties with public key certificates. PGP made that level of security available to everybody 30 years ago in 01991; Git uses it to sign tags, and Debian uses it to sign packages since 02005: https://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt https://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt. Every HTTPS website uses something similar, though browsers routinely trust untrustworthy CAs, which vitiates the security of the scheme. While we can't expect bank employees to be as technically sophisticated as Debian volunteers, I do think it's reasonable to expect them to be less than 15 years behind, particularly when tens of millions of dollars are at stake. I don't believe that this will actually happen with the existing banking institutions; instead, I believe that they will fail and demand bailouts, which will just expand the scope of the disaster.
- hungryforcodes 5y ago> Someone who claims they are using 2FA, but actually authenticates with email and/or phone numbers, is committing fraud. OK. I'll send you the list of all the companies that have done 2FA with me via email or a telephone number, and you can hit them up for fraud. Good luck! /s
- livinglist 5y agothis is good
- ximeng 5y agohttps://www.hsbc.com.hk/ways-to-bank/phone/voice-id/ https://www.hsbc.com.hk/ways-to-bank/phone/voice-id/ HSBC Hong Kong allows you to use your voice to log in to phone banking without a PIN. What could go wrong.
- MrPatan 5y agoHSBC everywhere pushes it "for security". This has been insecure since the invention of the tape recorder. HSBC, not even once.
- dillondoyle 5y agoI refuse to accept the terms for Schwab's 'voice authentication' it asks me to every time I login.
- aasasd 5y agoWell, with the previous voice-faking tech releases I kinda expected that the scams are gonna evolve from garbled “Hi ma, I've been in a road accident, need to pay off, please send money to this number”. But they escalated quicker than I could guess.
- 101008 5y agoI never thought about this scenario but now I am kind of scared. I guess that they would need a lot of data from my own voice to train a model like that. I am a kind of happy now that my podcast was taken down due to copyright infringment :)
- PicassoCTs 5y agoSir, we called you to have a extended sampling conversation about your cars extended warranty.
- 101008 5y agoI don't have a car, thanks :D
- lelandfe 5y agoMy 90 year old grandma had a fraudster call her last month claiming that her son had been in a car accident and needed money to pay for his emergency surgery If that call had instead been a pitch-perfect replication of my dad’s voice - or my aunt - I guarantee you it would have worked.