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Unless I’m misremembering, the login to their general system was done by never sending the password over the wire. Instead they used js to do some sort of hashi
by aidos 5y ago
Unless I’m misremembering, the login to their general system was done by never sending the password over the wire. Instead they used js to do some sort of hashing type system locally.
But during the heartbleed attack when their systems were shown to be vulnerable, that was one of their arguments as to why it wasn’t so bad.
- pxx 5y agoThey pretty heavily fumbled exactly this heartbleed response too. They claimed they "weren't vulnerable" because of this setup but they clearly were. If you exfiltrated an SSL key, which heartbleed allowed, you can serve whatever JS (including JS that just explicitly exfiltrated your passphrase) you wanted to end users. LastPass is full of clowns. There's already two examples of their cavalier approach to what should be simple security in this thread and I'm pretty sure there are more.
- chmod775 5y ago> Instead they used js to do some sort of hashing type system locally. Just the other day a co-worker brought up this idea as an offhand remark. After bouncing it off those present, it took him all of twenty seconds to see why it might do harm and will do little good. You'd think a password manager would employ some security minded people who could shoot down ideas that bad immediately.
- mustyoshi 5y agoWhat were the counterpoints?
- chmod775 5y agoA weakness in your clientside hashing will make your site weaker to brute-force attacks, since it will reduce the number of hashes (or passwords) an attacker has to try (collisions in client-side hashes will too, but very negligibly for a good hash function). It's also impossible to recover from without relying on another form of authentication to re-establish trust. For many sites this means downgrading to single-factor. Any hash upgrade mechanism can be abused by a (possibly MITM) attacker to change a user's password while leaving you and the user none the wiser that specifically this occurred. If you need to lock someone out while their phone is beeping at them over their bank account being emptied, while not even making it look like their password was changed, that sounds like a fun way. Lastly it's virtually the same as plaintext, since any salt will be known by even just a passive attacker. A true MITM won't even have to brute-force the hash. Conclusion: Might do harm, will do little good.