6 ms·

> you can’t get [...] the encrypted form (that is plaintext equivalent) by watching the network or by posing as the server. Not by watching the network. Becaus

> you can’t get [...] the encrypted form (that is plaintext equivalent) by watching the network or by posing as the server. Not by watching the network. Because the outer protocol is PEAP, which is similar to TLS I understand. So not completely broken. But when you pose as a server? Of course the definition of "easy" might vary. What some world-class experts presented at Defcon 9 years ago, is it considered easy? https://web.archive.org/web/20160316174007/https://www.cloudcracker.com/blog/2012/07/29/cracking-ms-chap-v2/ https://web.archive.org/web/20160316174007/https://www.cloud...

tinus_hn 5y ago
As far as I know there is no difference whether you are just watching the network or are posing as the server.
- usr1106 5y ago
  While I am not the absolute expert and have not really studied the specs I would cautiously claim this is not correct. The outer protocol is PEAP, a variant of TLS. Listening to what is sent inside is impossible in most practical cases. However, if you are the server (or rogue access point) obviously you see all traffic passing through that tunnel in clear text.
  - tinus_hn 5y ago
    The idea is that the real server has access to the encrypted/hashed version of the password so it can decrypt the communication (and so does the client as the user is entering the password). But a fake server would not have that and thus be unable to decrypt the communication.
    - usr1106 5y ago
      That's not how TLS / PEAP works. It's asymmetric cryptography initially (to agree a symmetric key). That's why it's important the client verifies it does not talk to a rogue server.
      - tinus_hn 5y ago
        Yes, that is true. But the information gained by the server if it is rogue is limited, you aren’t directly sending the password. That is the point. Practically the step of verifying the server is very hard because the client UI doesn’t provide a way; there is no agreement on what the certificate should be.

tinus_hn 5y ago

As far as I know there is no difference whether you are just watching the network or are posing as the server.

usr1106 5y ago
While I am not the absolute expert and have not really studied the specs I would cautiously claim this is not correct. The outer protocol is PEAP, a variant of TLS. Listening to what is sent inside is impossible in most practical cases. However, if you are the server (or rogue access point) obviously you see all traffic passing through that tunnel in clear text.
- tinus_hn 5y ago
  The idea is that the real server has access to the encrypted/hashed version of the password so it can decrypt the communication (and so does the client as the user is entering the password). But a fake server would not have that and thus be unable to decrypt the communication.
  - usr1106 5y ago
    That's not how TLS / PEAP works. It's asymmetric cryptography initially (to agree a symmetric key). That's why it's important the client verifies it does not talk to a rogue server.
    - tinus_hn 5y ago
      Yes, that is true. But the information gained by the server if it is rogue is limited, you aren’t directly sending the password. That is the point. Practically the step of verifying the server is very hard because the client UI doesn’t provide a way; there is no agreement on what the certificate should be.