3 ms·
This is true, in some cases. My point is that more broadly false alarms a failures to alarm must be individually reviewed and cause for failure identified. As
by dredmorbius 5y ago
This is true, in some cases.
My point is that more broadly false alarms a failures to alarm must be individually reviewed and cause for failure identified. Assuming that all more most failures are last-mile will work ... until it doesn't. Reviewing and demonstrating that the failure was or was not "last-mile" is what's required.
False signal, improper sensor detection, bad comms (generating or inhibiting signal), bad processing, confusing training or testing events for actual, having an actual alert during a test or drill, and errors in broadcasting alerts to the general public and/or the response to those alerts, might all be components to assess. "Last mile" concerns that last stage.
Since it's one that's often outside the core of an alerting system, and may involve many independent entities (people and/or organisations), it is likely to malfunction. Streamlining procedures and drilling frequently will help identify any such issues and iron them out.
Note that though tsunamis move quickly (> 800 kph / 500 mph in open ocean), the fact that they are often travelling immense distances (100s or 1,000s of miles or km) means that there are almost always many minutes, and quite often many hours for alerts to be sent and responded to. Earthquakes afford seconds to minutes, the timeframes are nearly two orders of magnitude less.
- dredmorbius 5y agos/alarms a failures/alarms and failures/