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Regardless of whether or not these claims are true, it sounds to me like it's time to 1. Have a proper & independent security audit of all root CAs. 2. Have a
by Tharkun 15y ago
Regardless of whether or not these claims are true, it sounds to me like it's time to
1. Have a proper & independent security audit of all root CAs.
2. Have a long, hard think about the SSL policies of some major websites. Facebook and GitHub, for instance, use certs issued by two different CAs. This makes it that much harder for me to make an informed judgement about their validity.
3. Rethink the whole trust model. It hinges on the policies of some companies out to make money, rather than out to secure the internet. These money-grabbing folks seem a lot more interested in the money-grabbing part than in the securing part.
- wnoise 15y agoCAs will continue to be broken into, or be pressured by governments. If the trust model doesn't change, nothing else will matter. The best suggestion I've seen is to allow certs to be signed by multiple CAs (currently the X.509 certificate format doesn't allow this). Subverting multiple certificate authorities is much harder. (This will also need browser checks to ensure they're from truly different organizations, rather than just different names, or even from different countries for the paranoid.) It also gives software vendors a nice way to show which CAs they trust -- rather than including the list of keys with their software, instead they can sign the CAs certifying keys, and revoke when they are no longer trusted.