Here is perhaps a better wording of my ultimate concern about the article: The NSA's relationship to AT&T, even in the context of the article, is not dissimilar

Here is perhaps a better wording of my ultimate concern about the article: The NSA's relationship to AT&T, even in the context of the article, is not dissimilar to the FBI's. A variety of federal agencies have extremely close relationships with AT&T (and generally all other major telecoms) including colocated staff and equipment---equipment being somewhat required by the lawful intercept protocol design. The American public should be made aware that this is now a broad, nationwide concern that's rooted in the everyday policy of telcos and the federal government... tangling it up so much in _this specific building_ with borderline conspiratorial implications mystifies the issue and makes it actually seem smaller than it is. What the NSA does at 33 Thomas is not special, it is mundane. And that is much more frightening. If anything I suspect the NSA's intercept infrastructure is inferior to that of the FBI, because it's more likely to be legacy and because the NSA likely insists on transitioning the data to one of their own networks (which AT&T almost certainly has a hand in operating). There's talk in the documents of an NSA engineer having to work on an intercept project... rather surprising as law enforcement agencies just fill out the form and get the data! I suspect the NSA wanted to set up its own crypto equipment in an AT&T facility. The possibility that the NSA was somehow involved in the design of the building is a theory with little evidence, and seems unlikely: AT&T had fairly detailed design standards for telephone offices, drawn from a variety of papers in e.g. BSTJ exploring the different practical factors. Even more elaborate design requirements were imposed by Cold War research on nuclear survivability by the military and AEC, and military concerns of sabotage (which had been a design consideration in telecom networks since WWII when it was feared the Japanese would come ashore sneakily and destroy West Coast telephone infrastructure, although this never occurred). It's difficult to imagine an NSA desire that the building would not have met: they could obtain space for equipment/technicians, cross-connections, and access to their own secure networks in any major exchange. The facilities were highly secure by virtue of being major exchanges. The NSA does apparently have a SCIF there but "SCIFing" existing spaces, i.e. in leased buildings, is a well understood process that doesn't require any special involvement (and couldn't have anyway as the modern SCIF concept is newer than the building). Indeed, if the NSA has been so deeply involved in 33 Thomas, perhaps because of it being a critical exchange in the international network, one would wonder if they are similarly involved in other such exchanges like Mojave, or SCPs such as those of the competitive long distance carriers? I'm sure they are, no speculation about the architect's loyalties required.