3 ms·
> Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. And ver
by goodpoint 5y ago
> Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier.
And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks.
It's not a "bug" in Tor, it's true for any data transmission. And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack.
> I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable.
"unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives.
Tor would be more resilient if a large number of organizations and individuals ran their own nodes. We can encourage participation. Other than that, the best thing we can do is develop store-and-forward systems on top of Tor that resist timing attacks. Briar is a good example.
- xvector 5y ago> And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. I am not talking about correlation attacks, but total deanonymization. Completely deanonymizing 1 in 300 connections is not "ineffective." You'd catch a lot of regular Tor users, which would likely be your target anyways. > And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. I cannot run malicious VPN nodes for other users of my VPN. It isn't vulnerable to the attack at all. > "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. A trustworthy no-logs VPN is a perfect alternative.