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> AKA a global observer Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper an

> AKA a global observer Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. > Bad node owners largely not cooperate with each other, and this keeps Tor safe. It does not. Nearly 10% of Tor nodes were run by a bad actor at a certain point this year. About 1 in 300 Tor users were completely deanonymized at that point in time. Much more if you use mobile Tor, which doesn't seem to pin a guard node. "a 16% chance that a Tor user would connect to the Tor network through one of KAX17’s servers, a 35% chance they would pass through one of its middle relays, and up to 5% chance to exit through one." - https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running-hundreds-of-malicious-tor-relays/ https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running... I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. > I2P has been around for 18 years. I2P is not well maintained, it is not a mixnet, and it does not have the same security guarantees as the Nym mixnet. https://blog.nymtech.net/vpns-tor-i2p-how-does-nym-compare-8576824617b8 https://blog.nymtech.net/vpns-tor-i2p-how-does-nym-compare-8... > Please do use HN to advertise cryptocurrencies. Please do not accuse HNers of "advertising cryptocurrencies." Merely mentioning the existence of a tokenized mixnet is not advertisement. We are allowed to talk about obviously relevant technologies, especially ones that improve on existing ones in novel ways.

goodpoint 5y ago
> Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. It's not a "bug" in Tor, it's true for any data transmission. And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. > I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. Tor would be more resilient if a large number of organizations and individuals ran their own nodes. We can encourage participation. Other than that, the best thing we can do is develop store-and-forward systems on top of Tor that resist timing attacks. Briar is a good example.
- xvector 5y ago
  > And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. I am not talking about correlation attacks, but total deanonymization. Completely deanonymizing 1 in 300 connections is not "ineffective." You'd catch a lot of regular Tor users, which would likely be your target anyways. > And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. I cannot run malicious VPN nodes for other users of my VPN. It isn't vulnerable to the attack at all. > "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. A trustworthy no-logs VPN is a perfect alternative.

goodpoint 5y ago

> Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. It's not a "bug" in Tor, it's true for any data transmission. And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. > I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. Tor would be more resilient if a large number of organizations and individuals ran their own nodes. We can encourage participation. Other than that, the best thing we can do is develop store-and-forward systems on top of Tor that resist timing attacks. Briar is a good example.

xvector 5y ago
> And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. I am not talking about correlation attacks, but total deanonymization. Completely deanonymizing 1 in 300 connections is not "ineffective." You'd catch a lot of regular Tor users, which would likely be your target anyways. > And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. I cannot run malicious VPN nodes for other users of my VPN. It isn't vulnerable to the attack at all. > "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. A trustworthy no-logs VPN is a perfect alternative.