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Any intelligence agency with the ability to monitor the majority of Tor traffic (AKA a global observer) would have no problem at all doing correlation attack ag

Any intelligence agency with the ability to monitor the majority of Tor traffic (AKA a global observer) would have no problem at all doing correlation attack against a VPN provider. > Intelligence agencies and bad actors alike have immense incentive to saturate the Tor network with bad nodes Bad node owners largely not cooperate with each other, and this keeps Tor safe. > the future of anonymous communication will be a mixnet resistant to correlation attacks I2P has been around for 18 years. Please do use HN to advertise cryptocurrencies.

xvector 5y ago
> AKA a global observer Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. > Bad node owners largely not cooperate with each other, and this keeps Tor safe. It does not. Nearly 10% of Tor nodes were run by a bad actor at a certain point this year. About 1 in 300 Tor users were completely deanonymized at that point in time. Much more if you use mobile Tor, which doesn't seem to pin a guard node. "a 16% chance that a Tor user would connect to the Tor network through one of KAX17’s servers, a 35% chance they would pass through one of its middle relays, and up to 5% chance to exit through one." - https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running-hundreds-of-malicious-tor-relays/ https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running... I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. > I2P has been around for 18 years. I2P is not well maintained, it is not a mixnet, and it does not have the same security guarantees as the Nym mixnet. https://blog.nymtech.net/vpns-tor-i2p-how-does-nym-compare-8576824617b8 https://blog.nymtech.net/vpns-tor-i2p-how-does-nym-compare-8... > Please do use HN to advertise cryptocurrencies. Please do not accuse HNers of "advertising cryptocurrencies." Merely mentioning the existence of a tokenized mixnet is not advertisement. We are allowed to talk about obviously relevant technologies, especially ones that improve on existing ones in novel ways.
- goodpoint 5y ago
  > Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. It's not a "bug" in Tor, it's true for any data transmission. And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. > I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. Tor would be more resilient if a large number of organizations and individuals ran their own nodes. We can encourage participation. Other than that, the best thing we can do is develop store-and-forward systems on top of Tor that resist timing attacks. Briar is a good example.
  - xvector 5y ago
    > And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. I am not talking about correlation attacks, but total deanonymization. Completely deanonymizing 1 in 300 connections is not "ineffective." You'd catch a lot of regular Tor users, which would likely be your target anyways. > And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. I cannot run malicious VPN nodes for other users of my VPN. It isn't vulnerable to the attack at all. > "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. A trustworthy no-logs VPN is a perfect alternative.
bbqbbqbbq 5y ago

xvector 5y ago

> AKA a global observer Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. > Bad node owners largely not cooperate with each other, and this keeps Tor safe. It does not. Nearly 10% of Tor nodes were run by a bad actor at a certain point this year. About 1 in 300 Tor users were completely deanonymized at that point in time. Much more if you use mobile Tor, which doesn't seem to pin a guard node. "a 16% chance that a Tor user would connect to the Tor network through one of KAX17’s servers, a 35% chance they would pass through one of its middle relays, and up to 5% chance to exit through one." - https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running-hundreds-of-malicious-tor-relays/ https://therecord.media/a-mysterious-threat-actor-is-running... I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. > I2P has been around for 18 years. I2P is not well maintained, it is not a mixnet, and it does not have the same security guarantees as the Nym mixnet. https://blog.nymtech.net/vpns-tor-i2p-how-does-nym-compare-8576824617b8 https://blog.nymtech.net/vpns-tor-i2p-how-does-nym-compare-8... > Please do use HN to advertise cryptocurrencies. Please do not accuse HNers of "advertising cryptocurrencies." Merely mentioning the existence of a tokenized mixnet is not advertisement. We are allowed to talk about obviously relevant technologies, especially ones that improve on existing ones in novel ways.

goodpoint 5y ago
> Between a single malicious node and global observer is the simple act of running many Tor nodes, which is comparatively much cheaper and much easier. And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. It's not a "bug" in Tor, it's true for any data transmission. And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. > I don't know about you, but a 0.3% chance of deanonymization on every route change is pretty unacceptable. "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. Tor would be more resilient if a large number of organizations and individuals ran their own nodes. We can encourage participation. Other than that, the best thing we can do is develop store-and-forward systems on top of Tor that resist timing attacks. Briar is a good example.
- xvector 5y ago
  > And very ineffective, compared to a global observer like PRISM. Tor makes no secret that real time traffic is vulnerable to correlation attacks. I am not talking about correlation attacks, but total deanonymization. Completely deanonymizing 1 in 300 connections is not "ineffective." You'd catch a lot of regular Tor users, which would likely be your target anyways. > And VPNs are way, way more vulnerable to such attack. I cannot run malicious VPN nodes for other users of my VPN. It isn't vulnerable to the attack at all. > "unacceptable" is as strange word to use when there are no practical alternatives. A trustworthy no-logs VPN is a perfect alternative.

bbqbbqbbq 5y ago