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If you run a program on a virtual machine, then it is not "running on your computer". It is "running on a virtual machine, running on your computer", and the se
by jerf 15y ago
If you run a program on a virtual machine, then it is not "running on your computer". It is "running on a virtual machine, running on your computer", and the security implications are different. Law #1 still holds. Especially if you are unwilling to simply take as given the perfection of the virtual machine... which history says is not a wise thing to take as a given.
That's also which qixxiq is wrong in the GP post; it's only true if you assume that Apple's security is perfect. As a practical matter as a user it's a tolerable approximation, especially if you have no personal assets of value on your phone, but if you're really concerned about security it is not something you can assume.
- javert 15y agoIf you run a program on a virtual machine, then it is not "running on your computer". I strongly disagree. This is an equivocation of the words "running on your computer," though I understand the technical reason why you might say what you did. Honestly, this article comes across as poor excuse-making by Microsoft for not having decent security. Especially if you are unwilling to simply take as given the perfection of the virtual machine... which history says is not a wise thing to take as a given. From what I can tell, process virtual machines can provide a very good sandbox that allows you to safely run arbitrary code, modulo whatever permissions you explicitly give it. Yes, writing a fully correct virtual machine is surely very difficult, but software can be secured eventually by trial and error, especially if the codebase is kept small, which you can (in principle) do with a process virtual machine. If you have citations to show me why I'm wrong on this aspect, I'd appreciate it, as I have a genuine intellectual interest in VM security.
- jerf 15y agoAnd I disagree with your disagreement. The different phrasing captures an important security aspect of running software, it is not merely a semantic game. You're trying to present VMs as an easy answer to security, and I'm trying to show you why that's not a valid way of approaching the question. Trying to game the definitions won't undo my points here. "From what I can tell, process virtual machines can provide a very good sandbox that allows you to safely run arbitrary code, modulo whatever permissions you explicitly give it." Take your choice of virtual machine, and poke it into the search box on http://osvdb.org/ http://osvdb.org/ . Don't forget the things you might not consider VMs, like the Javascript engines in the browsers. I know that's less "citation" than "metacitation", but in the spirit of teaching one to fish I think it's more useful. Or just google it, plus the word "vulnerability". As an acceptable technique for quickly and easily securing low-security-requirement applications, sure. As an easy answer for everything, no, their history does not suggest that's the answer. I'm not aware of any VM that hasn't had a history of at least some bad vulnerabilities, and what confidence can you have that there aren't others lying in wait for any given VM? (Interestingly, OSVDB doesn't have anything for Google nativeclient, but Google search does.)
- javert 15y agoSaying "there are lots of VMs with security problems, therefore VMs cannot be secure" is faulty logic. Most (perhaps all) existing VMs are quite complicated and are not designed specifically to be secure, but that does not have to be the case. I bet I could write a secure VM in C that interprets some simple toy "virtual machine code" with around, say, 2^5 instructions. What I have in mind here is something like TinyVM [1]. [1] https://github.com/GenTiradentes/tinyvm https://github.com/GenTiradentes/tinyvm
- arethuza 15y agoYoud should: - Implement your VM - Release the source code for inspection - Provide a way for anyone to upload code (e.g. via the web) into an instance of the VM on a server you control - Give an increasing bounty for each security bug found - Publically state that you are encouraging people to try cracking it That would be fun :-)
- comex 15y agoAnything in a modern operating system other than the kernel can be considered to be running in a virtual machine; when people refer to running a program on their computer, they're not usually talking about kernel modules. Apple's security is not perfect, of course, but these are supposed to be immutable laws: we can't fix problems caused by them because they are fundamental to how computers work. It is possible in theory to build a completely secure kernel.
- waitwhat 15y agoAnything in a modern operating system other than the kernel can be considered to be running in a virtual machine The level of isolation between processes running on the same machine doesn't really come close to that afforded to processes running inside different VMs.
- wmf 15y agoBut that's an OS design flaw, not an "immutable law". It doesn't apply to, say, EROS.
- ars 15y agoMaybe it doesn't, but it could. So the first law doesn't seem correct. As the simplest example a multi uses unix operating system allows lots of people to run programs on the same computer and barring errors it works fine in separating them.
- justincormack 15y agoSome resources are virtual, so yes it is a vm. Processes are one level, then there are bsd jails, linux containers, lots of vm types. All have different security issues, once processes seemed enough isolation. In the end the bugs matter most, and vm isolation has bugs too, they have just been harder to find and exploit. Security is not absolute, just a matter of degrees.
- andreyf 15y agoWhat about nacl? http://code.google.com/p/nativeclient/ http://code.google.com/p/nativeclient/