3 ms·
Sending logs to a dedicated AWS account is usually done for compliance. That account will have rules set via AWS Organization policies that limit IAM user right
by raffraffraff 5y ago
Sending logs to a dedicated AWS account is usually done for compliance. That account will have rules set via AWS Organization policies that limit IAM user rights and protect S3 buckets from being tampered with. I don't see why it should be necessary to ban read-only access to these logs for troubleshooting.
Anyone here know a good legal, compliance or best practice reason for blocking all access, or did the infra/sec team just get carried away here?
IMO the biggest issue other engineers tend to have with security is that it needlessly restricts them to the point where their job sucks. It's just as important to avoid "too much restriction" as "too little restriction".
- capn_duck 5y agoYea I completely understand the complexities that emerge when you're doing this stuff for a ~1500 person organization. And I know that overwhelmingly the people building these systems are talented and competent and have a stake in things and take pride in what they're doing. My comment was really more in response to the tone of the parent comment which insinuates that these helpless devs just can't figure out what the fuck is going on. Coming from a team that builds and supports an end user suite of applications. I'm not asking you to bend over backwards like I would have to do for a client. But at least don't enter in to conversations with that attitude. You are in a service organization. You deliver value insofar as you can help the next link in the chain.
- michaelt 5y ago> Anyone here know a good legal, compliance or best practice reason for blocking all access The philosophies include: 1. Applying a maxim like "Principle of Least Privilege", or "That which is not allowed, is forbidden". Maybe through choice, maybe due to standards like PCI-DSS and SOC2. 2. Blocking access isn't a problem, because we're going to grant access requests quickly. Just as soon as we fill these five vacancies on the team.... 3. Surely bugs making it to production will be a very rare event? Aren't these developers testing properly? 4. Don't we have test environments for troubleshooting? Isn't the heart of devops that you have a test pipeline that you have confidence in? If your developers think they're likely to deploy buggy software to production, maybe you aren't ready for devops... 5. Any large organisation will, at some point in its history, have had some chump run their test code against the production system and send every customer an e-mail saying "Hello World". If that happened when you had 30 developers, I doubt hiring standards are any higher now you have 300 developers! Stopping that happening again is common sense professionalism. 6. Would you want Google's 100,000 engineers to have read-only access to your gmail account? Of course you wouldn't, you've got loads of private shit in there. And if you were CEO, would you want an intern on a 2 week placement to be able to download the entire customer database? Of course you wouldn't. People having access - even read-only access - to the production system is a bad thing. 7. Locking down a lot of things gives the security team more political power, as every request to reduce restrictions or expedite a request is a favour owed.