> With people, we can say, "stop joking around", and it's a meta-discourse signal that we want stop discussing imaginary worlds and focus on the real one, for e

> With people, we can say, "stop joking around", and it's a meta-discourse signal that we want stop discussing imaginary worlds and focus on the real one, for example, which has to be totally self-consistent. - > We get a distinct feeling that we don't understand something, and a different feeling when things click together. Or when we hear a syntactically valid (in other words, pattern-matching) but nonsensical sentence (like "colorless green ideas sleep furiously"), or see a Penrose triangle, and we cannot imagine an example, we get a very specific feeling that something is wrong. It's true that the human mind has the capability to do these things sometimes (and within certain specifically designed frameworks like the scientific method, do it highly reliably)....but whether we do do it (or even have the capability) with consistent, high level success across various domains is a very different matter.