This isn't a defect, it's a benefit. It's mathematically proven that an electorate can prefer X even if a majority of its members prefer Y. Commonly proposed "

This isn't a defect, it's a benefit. It's mathematically proven that an electorate can prefer X even if a majority of its members prefer Y. Commonly proposed "majoritarian" methods using rankings can, for instance, elect X even though Y is preferred to X by a huge majority of voters and Y has twice as many first-place votes as X. http://scorevoting.net/CoreSuppPocket http://scorevoting.net/CoreSuppPocket And there's not even a clear mathematical definition of "majority winner". https://web.archive.org/web/20190219005032/https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/utilitarian-majoritarian https://web.archive.org/web/20190219005032/https://sites.goo... The goal of voting methods is to produce the most satisfying results possible (highest expected utility). And score/approval voting are excellent at that, and also radically simpler than ranked methods. https://electionscience.org/library/approval-voting-versus-irv/ https://electionscience.org/library/approval-voting-versus-i... https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/VSE5key https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/VSE5key https://medium.com/election-science/star-voting-is-simpler-than-irv-84b8990986f2 https://medium.com/election-science/star-voting-is-simpler-t... etc.