What in the world must DigiNotar's business plan for the future include? How could anyone trust them again? How is it possible that root-level certs were being

What in the world must DigiNotar's business plan for the future include? How could anyone trust them again? How is it possible that root-level certs were being issued and they've got no warning systems, no logging to determine what actually happened? And remember, we only really know about it now because someone caught the DigiNotar-issued SSL cert floating out in the wild and put it up on Pastebin! As rhizome noted, it borders criminality (if you think about it, does it even border?). These folks told users "Users of SSL certificates can depending on the browser vendor be confronted with a statement that the certificate is not trusted. This is in 99.9% of the cases incorrect, the certificate can be trusted" & their site is full of old defacement tags (on both of these, see http://isc.sans.org/diary/DigiNotar+breach+-+the+story+so+far/11500 http://isc.sans.org/diary/DigiNotar+breach+-+the+story+so+fa... - also worth reading). The CA system is broked. Everyone's known it for awhile, but man, it's still tough to look straight in the eyes at its brokenness like this.