4 ms·

Prediction: There will be a backdoor.

by zedshaw 15y ago

dotBen 15y ago
C'mon Zed, really? a) The code will be open source - the community can verify the code for anything untoward b) Given the nature of the product, most implementations are going to be behind a firewall anyway, with the storage layer talking to business logic. Even if there was a backdoor, and I'm sure there isn't, not sure how NSA could get in. Do you think there's a backdoor in NSA's open-source algorithm for SHA-1 too? I applaud the government for putting tax dollars back into open source. My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess). I generally like to know what I'm helping commit code to go do - although granted you have no idea what other open source projects are used for regardless of whether the lead sponsor is government or private company.
- seabee 15y ago
  If there are plenty of good uses for the code, I'd still want to improve it, even if I find out it's used by the Kitten Krusher 3000. Unless a "please don't use this code for evil" license is legally binding, that's just the nature of open source.
  - MrMorden 15y ago
    A "please don't use this code for evil" license would, by definition, not be open-source. (Also, such a license would almost certainly be ignored by evildoers.)
- pipeline_tux 15y ago
  I don't necessarily think there will be one, but I wouldn't be surprised either. Security flaws can be extremely subtle and 200,000 lines of code is a lot to review... Given that there's plausible deniability (we didn't do it intentionally, it was a genuine bug!), if you were them, wouldn't it at least cross your mind to try it? Also, at some point, if it becomes popular, some sysadmin at a large foreign government agency or company will forget to firewall off a box running it (ignoring that they could also be connecting back directly - automatic updates anyone?)
  - dmoney 15y ago
    But if there is a back door, doesn't releasing it as open source open the possibility that China's or Iran's equivalent of the NSA will audit the code and find it too?
    - zedshaw 15y ago
      That's why they should stop doing that. We aren't the smartest country on the planet anymore.
    - pipeline_tux 15y ago
      In which case the NSA say "Oops, it was a genuine mistake. Sorry." With 200,000 lines of code, there will almost certainly be unintentional security holes that haven't been found.
- adnam 15y ago
  I think it was just a joke, chill :)
  - zedshaw 15y ago
    A joke?! A JOKE?! You jest good sir. I merely put on my tinfoil hat and thought, "Hmmm, didn't this happen to OpenBSD, Windows, every crypto system ever, numerous databases, and probably SELinux?" Then extrapolated out to a very valid point. How dare you claim I am not deadly serious about the NSA putting a back door in a database that is intended to be secure for the internet. How. Dare. You!
    - marshray 15y ago
      I still can't tell if you're joking. I've seen a possible back door or two in this or that, but nothing like "every crypto system ever". If you have evidence of a back door in AES, SHA-2, or anything NIST has standardized (other than Dual_EC_DRBG or openly weakened stuff like export SSL) lots of people would like to hear about it.
      - william42 15y ago
        Didn't the NSA actually make DES stronger?
        marshray 15y ago
        Yes, the story goes that the NSA assisted IBM in its development by tuning the specific values in the S-boxes to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis, which had not yet been publicly discovered. They also reduced the key length from 64 to 56 bits. I found this suspicious and didn't accept the explanation that those 8 bits were needed for "parity". Yet, respected cryptographers say this actually brings the key size more in line with the effective strength. So those additional 8 bits in the key were not contributing to the security and it improves the "truth in labeling". Why would they build weaknesses into standard blocks, the biggest consumer of which is the US government itself? When the NSA had at times insisted on an upper limit for a protocol's security (e.g., export crypto), they usually would require a simple upper limit on the number of secret bits in the key. When they've submitted fixes they tend to be elegant and minimal (e.g. SHA-0 to SHA-1).
- taftster 15y ago
  "My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess)." It's likely just used exactly how you think it would be; to hold massive amounts of key/value data. No doubt, the NSA likely has tons of data to work with. A NoSQL approach would be seemingly beneficial for this use case.
bane 15y ago
Warning Zed! This is a humor free zone.
- zedshaw 15y ago
  Damn, you'd think with 200k lines of awesome Java that needs to be documented with a manual that's hundreds of pages long that uses 3 other massive Java projects and released by a government agency that's done backdoors in everything from crypto systems, operating systems, to even backdoors themselves, that there'd be at least a plausibility of them putting one in.
  - codexon 15y ago
    Just curious, what backdoors have been discovered from the NSA?
    - zedshaw 15y ago
      Oop sorry, I replied wrong. Your answer is above.
  - zedshaw 15y ago
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY That's just from a quick google. Back in the day there were stories of "A Visit from Mr. Brown" or something like that. The NSA or "some agency" would go around to anyone making crypto or operating systems and ask to be given backdoors in exchange for deals on export restrictions. Periodically a government agency in another country would find them and we'd be embarrassed. These days it's not as common since crypto exports aren't restricted (much) so the threat of, "If you don't add a backdoor we'll label your software a weapon and you can't sell it to the world." doesn't work. Then again, could all just be a huge conspiracy.....mwhahahaah.
    - codexon 15y ago
      Bruce Schneier explains why that is not a back door. http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#NSAKeyinMicrosoftCryptoAPI http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#NSAKeyinMicros... So other than this, are there any other NSA "backdoors in everything from crypto systems, operating systems, to even backdoors themselves"?

Prediction: There will be a backdoor.

by zedshaw 15y ago

Prediction: There will be a backdoor.

C'mon Zed, really? a) The code will be open source - the community can verify the code for anything untoward b) Given the nature of the product, most implementations are going to be behind a firewall anyway, with the storage layer talking to business logic. Even if there was a backdoor, and I'm sure there isn't, not sure how NSA could get in. Do you think there's a backdoor in NSA's open-source algorithm for SHA-1 too? I applaud the government for putting tax dollars back into open source. My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess). I generally like to know what I'm helping commit code to go do - although granted you have no idea what other open source projects are used for regardless of whether the lead sponsor is government or private company.

seabee 15y ago
If there are plenty of good uses for the code, I'd still want to improve it, even if I find out it's used by the Kitten Krusher 3000. Unless a "please don't use this code for evil" license is legally binding, that's just the nature of open source.
- MrMorden 15y ago
  A "please don't use this code for evil" license would, by definition, not be open-source. (Also, such a license would almost certainly be ignored by evildoers.)
pipeline_tux 15y ago
I don't necessarily think there will be one, but I wouldn't be surprised either. Security flaws can be extremely subtle and 200,000 lines of code is a lot to review... Given that there's plausible deniability (we didn't do it intentionally, it was a genuine bug!), if you were them, wouldn't it at least cross your mind to try it? Also, at some point, if it becomes popular, some sysadmin at a large foreign government agency or company will forget to firewall off a box running it (ignoring that they could also be connecting back directly - automatic updates anyone?)
- dmoney 15y ago
  But if there is a back door, doesn't releasing it as open source open the possibility that China's or Iran's equivalent of the NSA will audit the code and find it too?
  - zedshaw 15y ago
    That's why they should stop doing that. We aren't the smartest country on the planet anymore.
  - pipeline_tux 15y ago
    In which case the NSA say "Oops, it was a genuine mistake. Sorry." With 200,000 lines of code, there will almost certainly be unintentional security holes that haven't been found.
adnam 15y ago
I think it was just a joke, chill :)
- zedshaw 15y ago
  A joke?! A JOKE?! You jest good sir. I merely put on my tinfoil hat and thought, "Hmmm, didn't this happen to OpenBSD, Windows, every crypto system ever, numerous databases, and probably SELinux?" Then extrapolated out to a very valid point. How dare you claim I am not deadly serious about the NSA putting a back door in a database that is intended to be secure for the internet. How. Dare. You!
  - marshray 15y ago
    I still can't tell if you're joking. I've seen a possible back door or two in this or that, but nothing like "every crypto system ever". If you have evidence of a back door in AES, SHA-2, or anything NIST has standardized (other than Dual_EC_DRBG or openly weakened stuff like export SSL) lots of people would like to hear about it.
    - william42 15y ago
      Didn't the NSA actually make DES stronger?
      - marshray 15y ago
        Yes, the story goes that the NSA assisted IBM in its development by tuning the specific values in the S-boxes to be resistant to differential cryptanalysis, which had not yet been publicly discovered. They also reduced the key length from 64 to 56 bits. I found this suspicious and didn't accept the explanation that those 8 bits were needed for "parity". Yet, respected cryptographers say this actually brings the key size more in line with the effective strength. So those additional 8 bits in the key were not contributing to the security and it improves the "truth in labeling". Why would they build weaknesses into standard blocks, the biggest consumer of which is the US government itself? When the NSA had at times insisted on an upper limit for a protocol's security (e.g., export crypto), they usually would require a simple upper limit on the number of secret bits in the key. When they've submitted fixes they tend to be elegant and minimal (e.g. SHA-0 to SHA-1).
taftster 15y ago
"My only gripe is the lack of transparency as to what this is primarily used for within the NSA (to be expected I guess)." It's likely just used exactly how you think it would be; to hold massive amounts of key/value data. No doubt, the NSA likely has tons of data to work with. A NoSQL approach would be seemingly beneficial for this use case.

bane 15y ago

Warning Zed! This is a humor free zone.

zedshaw 15y ago
Damn, you'd think with 200k lines of awesome Java that needs to be documented with a manual that's hundreds of pages long that uses 3 other massive Java projects and released by a government agency that's done backdoors in everything from crypto systems, operating systems, to even backdoors themselves, that there'd be at least a plausibility of them putting one in.
- codexon 15y ago
  Just curious, what backdoors have been discovered from the NSA?
  - zedshaw 15y ago
    Oop sorry, I replied wrong. Your answer is above.
- zedshaw 15y ago
  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY That's just from a quick google. Back in the day there were stories of "A Visit from Mr. Brown" or something like that. The NSA or "some agency" would go around to anyone making crypto or operating systems and ask to be given backdoors in exchange for deals on export restrictions. Periodically a government agency in another country would find them and we'd be embarrassed. These days it's not as common since crypto exports aren't restricted (much) so the threat of, "If you don't add a backdoor we'll label your software a weapon and you can't sell it to the world." doesn't work. Then again, could all just be a huge conspiracy.....mwhahahaah.
  - codexon 15y ago
    Bruce Schneier explains why that is not a back door. http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#NSAKeyinMicrosoftCryptoAPI http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#NSAKeyinMicros... So other than this, are there any other NSA "backdoors in everything from crypto systems, operating systems, to even backdoors themselves"?