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> You can’t even isolate X applications without running other X.org because there is no permission control once the application has access into socket, and with
by badsectoracula 5y ago
> You can’t even isolate X applications without running other X.org because there is no permission control once the application has access into socket, and with socket it can see everything. And you can’t really rework that. Sometimes you need to rewrite whole thing.
Actually you can, the X server can run applications in an untrusted state where they cannot see other resources. It is not straightforward to setup though so running a nested X server is much simpler - at least until you realize that the same "untrusted" app has access to the rest of your system anyway.
> It is X.org which provides access for keystrokes and windows.
You can avoid that if you want but as others have mentioned you are way more likely to need that functionality for legitimate purposes.
- nicce 5y agoYou can finetune access control of your app into filesystem for example with AppArmor, but access for X.org is always required, remaining as the biggest attack surface.
- badsectoracula 5y agoIf you are going to configure something like AppArmor then you can certainly configure X to treat an application as untrusted.
- shatteredgate 5y agoNeither are really good options for graphical applications. The focus now is on using container sandboxing, at least with things like flatpak and snap anyway.