3 ms·
It should be noted up front that paying money for this stuff doesn't secure it either. There are frequent security bugs from well maintained projects too. It do
by roenxi 5y ago
It should be noted up front that paying money for this stuff doesn't secure it either. There are frequent security bugs from well maintained projects too. It does help though.
The best defence against this sort of catastrophic bug creeping up into a project is an aggressively simplified dependency tree. It isn't easy, and in some (most?) cases it might be most sensible to take on the risk and wait to fix bugs found in the wild. But if a project has 100 external dependencies - which is easy to do when a dependency tree gets deep - then maybe one of those maintainers will have reached a 1-in-100 level of corruption and evil. At that point, they might be slipping this sort of thing in on purpose. Securing a dependency chain is without doubt expensive.
- kevincox 5y agoThe argument made wasn't that paying more secures something. Just that paying more allows better response to insecurities.
- dathinab 5y ago> simplified dependency tree. Which doesn't necessary help. Like eight "simple/small" dependencies from the same author might be a better choice then two huge dependencies from two different authors. What matters is not the number of dependencies but the amount of code/complexity you depend one and the number of sources/authors/author-groups. Also in this case you probably would have keep this dependency in you simplified dependency tree...
- shukantpal 5y agoYes, but most dependencies are generally from different authors so the chance of malicious actors goes up with dependencies.
- khimru 5y agoJust look here: https://github.com/dtolnay?tab=repositories https://github.com/dtolnay?tab=repositories David Tolnay have 89 repos and if you are doing any Rust work at all the chances are high that you would have dozen of them in your dependency chain. Would merging of them help security? I don't think so: most of these crates are useful but they are quite diverse and it doesn't make much sense to put them into one package.
- dathinab 5y agoKinda, but also depends on the language a lot. E.g. in rust it's not uncommon to sometimes split libraries, e.g. -derive libraries (proc macros/derives), -sys (C-bindings without any logic/abstraction, most times auto-generated), and internal components. So counting just the number of "dependencies" can easily get you results, which are way off. Like actix-web has over 10 internal dependencies. (through I should note that they are in the same physical package/uploaded archive, i.e. they are treated as separate packages by rust, but are a single upload, have a single version number etc.).
- bshipp 5y agoJust to play devils advocate, perhaps having everyone synced to the same dependency is a blessing in disguise. Sure, it's awful when a breach is found, but since it affects everyone simultaneously at least it gets patched immediately. In addition, a hacker has so many choices that your likelihood of being targeted is lower than if it was a specific breach affecting a narrower scope of vulnerable systems. By the time you're targeted there's time to implement a patch. Just a voice for the benefits of distributed vulnerabilities.