Section 3 of the linked Parfit article touches on the notion that Rawls's distinction is mostly one of framing, not of actual recommendations: "Third, Rawls re

Section 3 of the linked Parfit article touches on the notion that Rawls's distinction is mostly one of framing, not of actual recommendations: "Third, Rawls regards Utilitarians as his main opponents. At the level of theory, he may be right. But the questions I have been discussing are, in practice, more important. If nature gave to some of us more resources, have we a moral claim to keep these resources, and the wealth they bring? If we happen to be born with greater talents, and in consequence produce more, have we a claim to greater rewards? In practical terms, Rawls's main opponents are those who answer Yes to such questions. Egalitarians and Utilitarians both answer No. Both agree that such inequalities are not justified. In this disagreement, Rawls, Mill, and Sidgwick are on the same side." That said, to your original point, Rawls does espouse maximizing for the least well-off ("maximin"). The "priority view" doesn't need to be so extreme. It can simply be biased toward improving the lot of the badly-off, rather than putting an absolute priority on the worst-off member of the population. They are definitely related, but it's muddled by Rawls's (somewhat inconsistent) rejection of a consequentialist framing.